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This dissertation is a collection of theoretical works discussing the relation-
ship between various human resource policies and employee retention. I build my
models on a turnover mechanism motivated by workersprivate information about
their feeling toward their current employer. Workers use this private information
when deciding whether to continue working for that institution. This turnover
mechanism provides interesting insights into various employment and compensa-
tion practices. This dissertation discusses the interactions of turnover with pay
systems, promotion and rm sponsored training.
The rst chapter I discuss the role of formal pay systems within rms. The role
of rigid bureaucratic wage rules within organizations has been a puzzle for some
time. This paper provides an explanation for the use of these formal pay systems
using two intuitive yet somewhat novel labor market assumptions. First, turnover
is induced through wages and private worker non pecuniary taste shocks. Second,
wage o¤ers by current employers are a signal of worker ability. In this model,
such asymmetry induces even higher turnover compared to full information over
worker ability. This increased turnover reduces the expected welfare of the worker.
I show how formal pay systems such as pay scales and budgets can mitigate this
problem and reduce ine¢ cient turnover. I also provide testable predictions in order
to distinguish the wage signaling model from the symmetric information model.
In the second chapter, I build an innite-horizon turnover model to address the
relationship between turnover, promotion and wages. Firms are deeply concerned
with the costs of employee turnover. However, traditional labor economic theory
is ill equipped to justify this concern. I explain how rms capture rent from its
continual relationships with an employee. Consistent with empirical studies, I nd
that an employees turnover rate will decrease once promoted. This paper also
generates new empirical predictions as well as other well established wage and
employee turnover dynamics.
In the third chapter, I examine the role of employee bonding contracts on
turnover e¢ ciency. Turnover is generated by realizations of a private taste shock
observed by the worker after a period of work with the employee. These shocks al-
low the rm to exercise a type of monopsonostic power over their current employees
creating ine¢ ciently high turnover in equilibrium. I show that if done correctly,
employee bonding contracts such as pension or minimum employment terms can
reduce this ine¢ ciency. The bond must be written so that the manager setting the
wage does not directly benet from the worker quitting. This separation of the
wage setter and the bond holder is necessary to generate the required e¢ ciency
improvements. A competitive labor market ensures that these e¢ ciency gains are
ultimately realized by the worker. Workers prefer rms that use devices to reduce
turnover ine¢ ciencies. I compare the results of this model to empirical work on
pensions and tuition reimbursement plans.
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CHAPTER 1
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND WAGE SIGNALS: THE
NEED FOR FORMAL PAY SYSTEMS
1.1 Introduction
The existence and prevalence of formal pay systems has been a puzzle among labor
economists for quite some time (see Doeringer and Piore 1971). In their seminal
paper quoted above, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) discuss and puzzle over
the use of pay scales in the rm that they study. While there have been many
studies that have documented the various particulars of such systems, there are few
economic theories that provide a reason for their use. I argue that such restrictions
have an important role in improving e¢ ciency through a reduction in employee
turnover. To my knowledge this is the rst paper to consider turnover reduction
as a motivation for such rules.
I develop a two period labor turnover model to examine the usefulness of pay re-
strictions. I assume perfect competition between rms for workers. Any expected
future prots are given to the worker at the beginning of the relationship. There-
fore any policy that improves e¢ ciency improves worker utility and is preferred by
the workers..
The need for pay restrictions arises under specic information assumptions.
These assumptions are asymmetric information about worker ability, wages as
signals, and private worker taste shocks. In this case, the equilibrium wage prole
causes higher turnover rates and lower prots than under symmetric information.
I show that rms are able to reduce or eliminate these ine¢ ciencies through formal
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pay systems such as pay scales or budget restrictions.
In my model the threat of employee turnover plays a key role. The turnover
mechanism I use is relatively unexplored, has appealing properties and provides
important new insights on the relationship between the worker and rm. Similar
to many other turnover models I assume that there is a match specic rent that is
realized after a period. The di¤erence between this model and standard turnover
models is the information structure of the rm-worker match. In this model, the
match specic taste shock is learned only by the employee after a period of work
with his current rm.1 These private taste shocks have a natural interpretation.
They are the workers attitudes toward the non pecuniary aspects of the job.
Such non pecuniary aspects might include relationships with co workers, like or
dislike of the geographic area or family concerns. This taste shock is considered
by the worker when evaluating his quitting decision. This information asymmetry
between worker and rm induces a trade-o¤ between retention and ex post prot
through the wage o¤er. O¤ering a lower wage to the worker increases the rent on
the employee if he stays. But, it also reduces the chance that he will accept the
o¤er.
The workers information about his own preferences gives current employers
monopsonistic power. Suppose the current employer o¤ers a wage below marginal
product. Even though the worker is getting an outside o¤er equal to marginal
product the worker will accept the lower inside o¤er if his taste shock is high
enough. Therefore this private shock provides the current rm positive prot
in expectation. Since the current rm wages are below the outside wages the
1Traditional turnover models also use match specic rents to drive turnover. However the
rm always knows this match and is able to retain the worker when it is e¢ cient. Here this
match specic component is known only by the worker which generates a di¤erent wage setting
decision.
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resulting turnover rates are ine¢ ciently high.
I analyze this model under two di¤erent informational assumptions regarding
worker productivity. First, I assume that worker ability is common knowledge. I
show that the resulting prot is an upper bound to any equilibrium where wages
are a signal of ability. I then examine the model under the assumption that worker
ability is only observed by the workers current employer. I also assume that the
wage o¤ered by the workers current rm is a signal of ability to the outside market.
I show that the equilibrium wage prole for the wage signaling model induces
higher turnover probabilities than under symmetric information between rms.
The excessive turnover is more extreme for workers of lower ability. The duel
signaling and retention roles of wages are the source of this result. The current
rm has an incentive to signal low ability through a lower wage o¤er. The outside
market anticipates this and market expectations are less responsive to low wages.
Therefore, the inside-outside wage gap is larger for lower ability workers.
Once I have shown the adverse e¤ects of asymmetric information in this model
I examine possible solutions. These solutions are various commitment devices
such as formal pay systems. These systems allow the rm the ability to commit to
future wage proles before actually observing ability types. While these systems
have di¤erences their usefulness comes from their rigidity. By restricting the wage
o¤ers ex ante the rm reduces its capacity to signal worker ability in the future.
One particular system that I consider is pay scales. Here the rm commits to
pay workers within a certain range of wages. This range of wages is set before
observing worker ability. If the commitment is credible, this changes the signaled
ability given the actual wage o¤er. Outside beliefs are directly tied to outside o¤ers
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and worker turnover. By restricting the possible wage o¤ers, the rm can reduce
its incentive to underpay and therefore decrease employee turnover in equilibrium.
The second pay system that I consider is the use of managers and budget
restrictions. Here managers are given incentives to maximize expected output
conditional on a budget set by the rm. While turnover is an issue for the
managers there is no longer the same cost saving incentive beyond staying within
budget. By evaluating the managers based on output rather than on prot the
wage setters have no incentive to reduce costs below the budgeted amount. In this
case there exists equilibria where the rm is able to achieve more e¢ cient turnover
rates.
I also analyze the e¤ect of budget restrictions and pay scales under symmetric
information. While such restrictions can help to mitigate the ine¢ ciencies of wage
signaling they can be harmful under symmetric information. Just as conventional
wisdom suggests, strict budgetary restrictions on managers do not provide enough
freedom for managers to set prot maximizing wage o¤ers. Therefore I suggest
that such pay systems are most likely to be observed in markets where worker
ability is not common knowledge and compensation is observable.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. I review the relevant literature in
Section 2. I set up and analyze the symmetric information and wage signaling
models in Section 3. Section 4 examines the e¤ect of restrictive pay systems
under the di¤erent information assumptions. In Section 5 I discuss these results
in response to classical adverse selection models. Section 6 is the conclusion.
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1.2 Literature Review
From the early discussion in Doeringer and Piore (1971) economists have puzzled
over the prevalence and rigidity of formal pay systems. These formal pay systems
have been documented by a number of subsequent studies (ex. Baker et al 1994,
Dohmen 2004). Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) describes these systems as such, "the
rm used centralized policies to set salary levels and ranges, and determined how
performance ratings were used to award raises and bonuses." While these systems
may di¤er from rm to rm they have the common characteristic of being pre
determined centrally and at least somewhat rigid. While there is a vast literature
discussing job assignment, compensation and training of workers, the rigidity and
purpose of this bureaucracy remains relatively unexplored.
So far, the work on formal pay rules within an organization has focused on
improving performance by managers and employees. For example the theories on
tournaments (ex. Lazear and Rosen 1981) and up-or-out contracts (ex. Kahn and
Huberman 1981) rely on the rms ability to commit to reward workers that exert
high investments in human capital. Other theoretical work focuses on limiting
the discretion of managers thus reducing employee inuence activities (see Milgrom
1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1988a, 1988b) or favoritism (see Prendergast and Topel
1996).
Asymmetric information about worker ability has long been a central theme in
personnel economics. One topic of particular interest is how asymmetric informa-
tion about worker ability is advantageous to employers. Most of the theoretical
work on this type of asymmetry revolves around rms establishing, maintaining,
and capitalizing on this advantage (ex. Greenwald 1986).2 There has been a great
2For example Acemoglu and Pichke (1998, 1999) show that adverse selection caused by infor-
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deal of interest in the e¤ect of signals on labor market outcomes. One of the most
discussed signals in this literature is job assignment. Waldman (1984) was the
rst to show how this observable decision by the rm can a¤ect the protability of
this information asymmetry. He shows why rms might distort the employee pro-
motion decision to capture additional information rents. The idea of promotions
as signals has been extended in many di¤erent ways (see Milgrom and Oster 1987,
Ricart I Costa 1988, Waldman 1990, Bernhardt 1995, Golan 2005). Although the
result that workers are promoted less than the e¢ cient level is not fully robust
(see Golan 2005), the result that information asymmetry is exploited by the rm
is a common nding in this literature.3 This result however does not hold in the
current paper due to the signaling role of the wage o¤er. Additional discussion of
the di¤erence between this literature and the current paper is provided in Section
1.5.
One important assumption in this paper is that wages are a signal of ability.
The signaling aspect of wage o¤ers has been largely ignored with the notable
exception of Golan (2009).4 She uses a multi period bargaining model where
productivity is known only by workers and current employers. She shows that
high ability workers bargain with their employer to reduce their own wages early
in their career in order to fully reveal their ability. Later in their career, symmetric
information creates higher wages for more able workers. Higher ability workers
experience faster wage growth even without any increase in productivity. Although
wage signals play a key role in Golans work as well as mine, the setup and results
mation asymmetries can induce rm sponsored employee training.
3 For example Milgrom and Oster (1987) show that workers with visible high ability are more
likely to be promoted. Promoting workers with visible high ability reduces information rent by
a smaller amount. DeVaro and Waldman (2006) provide evidence along these lines focusing on
how promotion varies with the education level.
4In the asymmetric information models discussed above wages are not a signal of ability.
Workers with common observables will be o¤ered the same wages in equilibrium. Therefore the
wage o¤er conveys no additional information.
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of the paper are quite di¤erent. There is no turnover in her model. Also in her
model there is no need for commitment devices such as pay systems.
In addition to the vast theoretical work there has been evidence of some general
predictions of adverse selection models. Gibbons and Katz (1991) nd that the
wages of laid o¤workers are lower than those displaced after a plant closing where
pre termination wages are identical (see also Kahn 2009).5 Doiron (1995) nds
similar evidence using Canadian data. But Grund (1999) nds no such e¤ect in
his study of the German labor market. Stevens (1997) also nds that multiple
displacements have a lasting e¤ect on wages.
Uta Schonberg (2007) performs similar tests and nds evidence of asymmetric
learning for college graduates and symmetric learning for workers with only a high
school education. In addition to job assignment (ex. DeVaro and Waldman
2006) empirical economists have looked at previous job mobility (see Zhang 2007)
or private signals (See Pinkston 2008) to test for these e¤ects. Although not
unanimous, the evidence is largely consistent with information asymmetry in a
wide variety of markets.
In this paper, turnover plays a crucial role. There is a vast literature on various
types of turnover mechanisms. The papers on job search and matching provide
valuable insights into the turnover process (ex. Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b; Burdett
1978). In these classic models, turnover is a result of economic agents attempting
to improve expected match quality. Imperfect information and learning gradually
change worker and rmmatches over time. While these models are able to generate
5This approach to testing for asymmetric information has critics who argue that this di¤erence
is driven by recall bias (see Song 2007) or di¤erences in pre displacement wages (see Krashinsky
2002). Krashinsky argues that rms who lay o¤ workers tend to be larger rms that pay higher
wages in general. Therefore the large change in the wages by workers displaced by a layo¤ is
driven by the high pre termination wage.
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a number of empirical predictions they do not address the idea of employee turnover
costs.6 Many such theories assume workers are paid their marginal product (ex.
Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b). In this case there is no real loss to the rm when the
worker leaves. In other turnover models workers are given a xed proportion of
their match specic rent (ex. Mortensen 1978). In this case rms do incur an
economic loss when the worker switches employers. However a xed sharing rule
of the match specic rent may not be realistic. The cost of employee turnoveris
not adequately addressed by these classical turnover models.7
The main di¤erence between this paper and the classic turnover papers lies in
the information assumption about match quality. In the current paper I assume
that the quality of the match is known and experienced by the worker. In another
chapter of this dissertation I use a similar assumption as I consider promotion
timing, wages, and turnover (see chapter 2). In both papers the taste shock gives
the current employer some monopsonistic power when choosing the wage o¤er.
However, when workers decide to quit this induces an economic loss to the rm.
I argue that this economic loss is the foundation for employee turnover costs. In
chapter 2, I show that this dynamic monopsony power over current employees
induces rms to create and maintain relationships with individual workers over
time. I use this model to consider the promotion timing decision when promotion is
costly to the rm and the rm experiences outside pressures. In chapter 3 I consider
how employee bonding reduces turnover ine¢ ciencies caused by managers setting
6For example, in their study of four di¤erent hotels Hinkin and Tracy (2000) estimate the
turnover cost of a front-desk associate to be from 5 to 12 thousand dollars. Over half of this
gure is non-explicit productivity costs. See also Cascio (1999) and Wasmuth and Davis
(1983) for additional examples of costs of employee turnover.
7Under traditional theories, when countero¤ers are possible, the rm will never allow a worker
to leave before o¤ering him a wage equal to his marginal product. If workers are paid their
marginal product, turnover of a single worker will not a¤ect the rms protability. Under some
restrictive assumptions, existing theory can generate endogenous turnover while rms pay a wage
below marginal product. For example, a model with random outside wage o¤ers that assumes
away countero¤ers may have this feature (see, Munasinghe and Flaherty 2005).
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wages below marginal product. Aside from my work, a few papers use a similar
turnover mechanism based on private worker utility (ex. Novos 1994, Acemoglu
and Pischke 1998, Schonberg 2007, Ghosh 2007). Although none of them examine
the signaling aspect of wages that is the core of this paper.
1.3 The Model
In this section I introduce the turnover mechanism that drives this model. I
develop intuition on the source of turnover costs and the rents associated with
attracting and retaining individual workers. In order to isolate the e¤ects of
the turnover mechanism I rst assume that information on worker productivity is
symmetric. This initial analysis provides a benchmark for later analysis.
1.3.1 Symmetric Information about ability
There is free entry into production. All rms are identical. The only input is
labor and it is inelasticly supplied each period. A workers career lasts 2 periods.
All rms and workers are perfectly patient. All workers have marginal products
that are i.i.d. from a commonly known distribution F with support [aL; aH ]: I
will denote worker i0s marginal product each period as ai 2 [aL; aH ]: In the rst
period all information about ability is unknown. After a period of work the
workers ability becomes common knowledge.
Worker is utility consists of wages, a taste shock and a switching cost  
0 (if incurred). The switching cost is incurred only when the worker switches
employers. Worker i0s taste shock for rm k at time t is denoted as ki;t and is private
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information for the worker. All 0s are drawn independently from a commonly
known continuously di¤erentiable distribution G. The distribution G has a zero
mean and a continuously di¤erentiable density g: The hazard rate H(:) = g(:)
1 G(:)
is non-decreasing on its support. To ensure that turnover is sometimes e¢ cient, I
restrict the lower bound of the support of G to be <  . The worker only knows
his second period taste shock for the rm he worked at in period 1. All other taste
shocks are unknown. Since all rms are ex ante identical in the rst period, the
worker chooses the highest wage for his initial job. Perfect competition between
potential employers ensures that second period expected prots are part of the
workers period 1 wage.
At the beginning of period 2 the current and outside rms o¤er wages to the
worker. Given the current rms wage o¤er the workers utility if he stays with
the rm in period 2 is,
u2 = wi + i:
The worker incurs the same switching costs for all outside rms. If worker i enters
the outside market, he accepts the highest outside rm wage o¤er wi: In this case
his expected utility in period 2 is,
u2 = wi   : (1.1)
I assume that, if indi¤erent, the worker remains with the current rm. Therefore,
the worker will stay with his current employer if wi + i  wi   : The worker
will leave the current rm with probability,
Pr(wi + i  wi   ) = 1 G( wi   wi   ): (1.2)
The payo¤ to the rm is simply the marginal product of its employees minus
the wage costs. A rms wage decision for a given worker i, depends on the rst
10
period employment relationship.8
The denition of equilibrium that I use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In
the rst period all rms are identical so the worker chooses the rm that o¤ers the
highest wage W: In the second period all rms learn the ability of the worker, but
the value of  is known only by the worker himself. All rms make wage o¤ers
and the worker chooses between o¤ers. However the worker chooses his second
period employer after observing his shock  and all wage o¤ers. The timing of
the second period game is as follows.9
Stage 1: All rms observe ability and the current rm o¤ers a wage.
Stage 2: Outside rms observe the current rm wage o¤er and o¤er wages.
Stage 3: Employee observes the taste shock for the current rm and chooses
between o¤ers.
Stage 4: Production, payment and utility experienced.
In equilibrium the outside market will always bid wages up until the outside
rms are making zero expected prots.10 The current rm knows the workers
outside wage o¤er and chooses a wage to maximize prots. This gives us a
8We have not yet explicitly dened the outside option for the worker. It seems natural that
wages should be greater than zero. In order to avoid uninteresting corner solutions or negative
wages we impose the restriction that al > x (where x uniquely solves x
g(x )
1 G(x ) = 1).
However, if we instead allow negative wages and assume that there is no outside option the
results of the model are unchanged.
9In the benchmark model the timing is less important. Since workers enter the market with
positive probability and ability is common knowledge, they will be o¤ered their marginal product
by the outside market regardless of the current rms wage o¤er. However, to be fully consistent
with the subsequent model we specify the timing as below for both models.
10We know this because the current rm will never o¤er a wage greater than marginal product.
The lower bound of the distribution of the taste shock is less than minus the switching cost.
Therefore there is a strictly positive probability that the worker will enter the outside market.
Since the worker enters the market with a strictly positive probability, Bertrand like competition
forces the wage o¤er to equal marginal product.
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denition of equilibrium for the second period game.
Denition 1 The equilibrium of this economy for worker i is a current rm wages
o¤er wi; outside wage o¤er wi such that,
1. wi 2 arg maxw (ai   w) [1 G( wi   w   )] (Prot Maximization)
2. wi = ai (Zero Prot for Outside Firms)
Since the worker has information about his taste for the current rm, the
current rm has some monopsonistic power. It will o¤er a wage below marginal
product and if the workers taste shock is high enough, the worker will accept the
o¤er. The expected prots for the current rm in the second period is,
Vi = max
w
(ai   w) [1 G( wi   w   )] : (1.3)
This gives the rm positive expected prots in the second period. I now solve
for the equilibrium of this game. Substituting the Zero Prot condition into the
Prot Maximization condition I get,
Vi = max
w
(ai   w) [1 G(ai   w   )] (1.4)
= max
xi
xi [1 G(xi   )] where xi;t = ai   w: (1.5)
x is the ex post rent that a rm receives if the worker stays for the second
period. However, increasing x increases turnover. Note that the optimal value of
x is tied directly to the distribution of :
The rst order condition of (1.5) in terms of xi is,
xi =
1 G(xi   )
g(xi   ) =
1
H(xi   ) : (1.6)
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Recall that the hazard rate g
1 G is non-decreasing. The objective function is
quasi-concave so the rst order condition is necessary,11 su¢ cient and has a unique
solution. Let x solve the rst order condition (1.6). Since s are drawn i.i.d.
for all ability types the equilibrium satises xi = x for all i. From (1.4) and (1.5)
I know that Vi must also be the same for all i.
Vi = max
w
(at   w) [1 G( wi   w   )] (1.7)
= x [1 G(x   )] = V  for all i: (1.8)
This gives us the unique equilibrium for every realized ability.
Proposition 1 The unique equilibrium of the above economy is as follows, where
x and V  are as dened above.
wi = ai   x (1.9)
wi = ai (1.10)
Vi = V
 (1.11)
Turnover probability = G(x   ) 8i: (1.12)
Proof. above
Proposition 1 shows us that second period prot and turnover for any employee
will be the same regardless of realized ability. The current rm will o¤er a wage
that is exactly x less than marginal product. This uniform result comes from
the i.i.d. assumption of the workers taste shocks. If the worker stays with the
current rm in period 2 the current rm earns a prot of x regardless of ability
11xi;t  0 cannot solve the maximization problem since positive prots are possible. Therefore
the solution to the maximization problem must be on the open set (0;1): If the maximum exists
it must satisfy the rst order condition.
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type. Since the di¤erence between current and outside wage o¤ers is always x,
the turnover probability is always G(x   ). The expected second period prot
from employing worker i in the rst period is x [1 G(x   )] = V  regardless
of the realization of ability.
I now discuss how the information asymmetry between the worker and rm
causes turnover to be too high in equilibrium. If the current rm could observe
the workers taste shock, the rm would extract all rents from the shock if it is
e¢ cient for the worker to remain with the rm. If the shock is greater than
the negative switching cost the inside rm would pay just enough to induce the
worker to stay. If the shock is too low the rm will never o¤er a high enough
wage and the worker will quit. However in this model the rm does not know
the taste shock. It must o¤er a wage depending only on the workers ability. It
cannot extract all rents but gains rents in expectation by setting this wage below
marginal product (wi = ai   x). The worker receives an outside wage o¤er of
exactly marginal product. Therefore he will switch rms whenever  < x   :
The socially optimal turnover rule is to quit when  <  : The current rms
exploitation of monopsonistic power results in ine¢ ciently high turnover. I later
show that this ine¢ ciency is even greater when wage o¤ers are a signal of ability.
From this simple model I have established a few insights into the relationship
between the worker and the rm. The information on how the worker feels to-
ward their current employer is valuable to that rm. Wages optimally set below
marginal product means that rms experience an economic loss when workers quit.
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1.3.2 Wages as Signals
So far I have examined the model under symmetric information. I now analyze the
model when only the workers current employer directly observes worker ability. I
also assume the current rms wage o¤er is observed by the outside market. It is
possible now that the outside market infers something about the workers ability
from the current rms wage o¤er. I show that the equilibrium wage prole induces
higher turnover and lower second period prot than under symmetric information.
The assumptions of the model are the same as before except that now only
the current rm has information about productivity. The strategies for the cur-
rent rm are the possible wage o¤ers depending on realized worker ability. The
strategies for outside rms are the wage o¤ers depending on beliefs. The beliefs
of the outside market are conditional on the current rm wage o¤er. Let us de-
note the current rms wage o¤er depending on ability as wi(a): I will denote
the outside markets expectation of worker i0s ability as bi (w) : For tractability
I restrict beliefs to be the same for all rms.12 Bertrand like competition results
in the outside market always paying a wage equal to expected marginal product.
Therefore bi(w) is also the outside markets wage o¤er if it observes the signal w
from the current rm.
Given the belief function bi(w), the current rms expected payo¤ when ob-
serving ability ai 2 [aL; aH ] and o¤ering a wage wi(ai) equals,
max
w
(ai   wi(ai)) [1 G(bi (wi(ai))  wi(ai)  )] : (1.13)
12On the path of play this will naturally be satised in equilibrium. But o¤ the path of play
outside rms could have di¤ering beliefs about worker ability. The game between outside rms
would result in some expected maximal wage o¤er. Since the quitting decision is only determined
by the inside vs. outside options, we assume away such technicalities.
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I now dene Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for this model. A PBE is a wage
policy wi(:) : [aH ; aL] ! R and a set of beliefs bi(:) : R ! [aH ; aL] that satisfy
Condition 1 (Sequential Rationality) and Condition 2 (Consistency) as dened
below.
Condition 1 (Sequential Rationality)
wi (ai) 2 arg max
w
(ai   w) [1 G(bi (w)  w   )] 8ai 2 [al; ah] (1.14)
This condition guarantees that given the workers realized ability and strategy
of the outside market, the current rm is maximizing prots. Consistency of
beliefs for this equilibrium can be a bit unclear since the distribution of ability
types is continuous.13 However the following claim makes the resolution of this
problem straightforward.
Claim 1 Any wage prole that is part of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium must be
weakly increasing with ability.
Proof. In Appendix
This result that comes from the fact that rms with higher ability workers have
more to lose from a worker quitting. If it is worth paying a higher wage to retain
a low ability worker, it must also be worth paying the high wage to keep the high
ability worker as well. Because wages are weakly increasing with ability, any wage
o¤ered in equilibrium is o¤ered to a single ability type or a range of abilities. This
result greatly simplies the condition on the consistency of beliefs.
13In general it is unclear what the beliefs at a wage means when the set of ability types that
o¤er that wage is not convex.
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Condition 2 (Consistency) for any equilibrium current rm wage o¤er, wi(ai),
the outside o¤er, bi(wi(ai)); must be the expected ability type of all workers o¤ered
wi(ai), or the ability type of the single worker type o¤ered wi(ai).
Now that I have dened equilibrium in this setting I can nd and characterize
the equilibrium. The rst type of equilibrium that I discuss is the perfectly
separating equilibrium. This is when each ability type is o¤ered a di¤erent wage.
It seems natural that higher ability workers are o¤ered a higher wage. Al-
though in equilibrium the relationship need only be weak. A wage prole that
is strictly increasing with output might seem natural to avoid perverse incentives
for workers to under perform.14 Even in this model with no worker e¤ort, the
fully separating equilibrium is interesting as it has similarities to the symmetric
information outcome.15
Proposition 2 Let the function a^(x) be dened as,
a^(x) = aH +
Z x
x

1  z g (z   )
[1 G (z   )]

dz for x > x: (1.15)
The unique fully separating equilibrium is wi(ai) = ai a^ 1(ai) for all ai 2 [aL; aH ]
with beliefs bi(w) = w 1i (w) for all w 2 [wi(aL); wi(aH)].16
Proposition 2 shows that there is an equilibrium to this game. Further, the fully
separating equilibrium wage prole is unique. This equilibrium has the property
14That is, suppose output was a function of e¤ort as well as ability. The same wage for multiple
levels of output can induce some workers to exert ine¢ ciently low e¤ort.
15Most notably neither the fully separating equilibrium in the case of asymmetric informa-
tion nor the symmetric information outcome have multiple ability types o¤ered the same wage.
Therefore by comparing the fully separating equilibrium to the full information outcome we can
generate other predictions to distinguish these two models in the data.
16These equilibrium beliefs o¤ of the path of play are not unique but one solution is bi(w) = aH
for all w =2 [wi(aL); wi(aH)].
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that turnover and expected second period protability on the highest ability type
will be the same as in the symmetric information case. Also, turnover for each
ability type below aH is higher than under symmetric information. Also second
period protability is lower for lower ability types.
I now discuss why the fully revealing wage and turnover rate for the high
type must be the same as in the symmetric case. In the fully revealing case the
equilibrium wage o¤ered to the highest ability type will cause the outside market
to o¤er aH : Therefore under full revelation the upper bound on second period
prot is the second period prots from the symmetric information case. Further
since aH is the maximum ability available, the outside market will never o¤er a
wage above aH . Therefore if the current rm o¤ers the symmetric wage to the
highest ability type the rm can attain at least the second period prot from the
symmetric case. The wage o¤ered to the highest ability type in equilibrium will
be the same as in the symmetric case.
I now discuss the rest of the equilibrium. The current rms wage o¤er directly
a¤ects the outside o¤ers through the signaling role of the wage o¤er. Because
workers act optimally, turnover is increasing in the di¤erence between outside
and inside wage o¤ers (bi (wi)   wi): This means that the turnover rate is a
function of the current rms wage o¤er. To show that turnover must be decreasing
with the current rms wage o¤er in equilibrium, I assume otherwise and nd a
contradiction. Expected prots are the product of ex post rents (ai  w) and the
probability that the worker stays (1 G(:)). A rm with a higher ability worker
always has the option of paying the low ability equilibrium wage. If he does this,
then it follows that ex post rents must be higher than if he paid the higher wage.
If turnover is weakly lower for the lower wage, then prots associated with paying
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the low wage are higher. This means that the inside rm would prefer to pay the
low wage to the higher ability worker. This contradicts the result that more able
workers are paid higher wages.
As noted above, the turnover rate of the highest ability type is the same as under
symmetric information. Also, turnover rates on all other types must be higher
than under symmetric information. Therefore, the ine¢ ciencies associated with
excess turnover are greater in this equilibrium than under symmetric information.
For a given employee lowering the wage o¤er has three e¤ects on expected prot.
The rst is the obvious e¤ect of lowering the costs to the rm. The second e¤ect
is that a lower wage o¤er signals to the outside market that the worker is of lower
ability. This negative signal reduces his outside option, decreases the workers
probability of quitting, and increases prots. The third e¤ect is that a lower
wage reduces the workers incentive to remain with the rm, thereby increasing
the turnover rate. Combining the second and third e¤ects yield that lowering the
wage increases turnover probability. The outside market correctly anticipates the
rms tendency to underpay. That is, a $1 drop in the pay o¤ered by the current
rm reduces the signaled ability (and outside o¤ers) by less than $1. Thus, the
turnover probability is greater as wages are reduced. 17
In this equilibrium, all but the highest ability worker is paid a wage below
the wage paid give symmetric information. Therefore worker utility is lower and
17The result that turnover is higher under full separation may seem a bit at odds with the limit
pricing result of Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In their model, full separation under asymmetric
information results in the same entry rate as symmetric information. The key di¤erence has to
do with the actions available after full revelation. In their model, after the rst period price is
chosen and costs are revealed, the game is identical to symmetric information. There is no direct
e¤ect of the rst period price on the entrant. In my model, the wage chosen by the rst period
employer has a direct impact on the decision made by the employee. The outside market will o¤er
the same wage as under symmetric information, but the current rms wage is lower. Therefore
the worker will quit with a higher frequency than it would under symmetric information.
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turnover is less e¢ cient than under symmetric information.
Now that I have characterized and discussed the unique fully separating equi-
librium I will discuss pooling. Pooling exists when a range of ability types are all
o¤ered a common wage in equilibrium. The outside wage o¤er is equal to the sig-
naled ability of a worker o¤ered that wage. Pooling equilibria may alleviate some
of the problems caused by wage signals. However as long as multiple wages are
o¤ered in equilibrium there is excessive turnover reducing expected worker utility.
Proposition 3 The average expected second period prots for workers o¤ered the
highest wage is bounded above by x [1 G (x   )] which is the expected prot
under symmetric information. For any two wages o¤ered in equilibrium w0 < w00
The average turnover rate for workers o¤ered w0 is higher than for those o¤ered
w00:
Proof. See proof of Proposition 2
As above, the tendency for the rm to signal low ability through low wages
causes the outside markets beliefs to be less responsive to lower wages. Therefore
for lower wage o¤ers turnover is higher and average second period protability is
lower.
While I have shown that any separation in equilibrium induces negative e¤ects,
there may be a fully pooling equilibrium that can induce the same turnover rate
and expected second period prots as under symmetric information. If such an
equilibrium exists it will be unique. All worker types will be o¤ered the common
wage equal to the expected ability minus x: All risk associated with ability
realization is borne by the rm through the common wage. Turnover rates will
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be constant for all abilities as a result of the common inside wage and common
outside wage.
I now discuss why although the wages are quite di¤erent we get the same
turnover rates in this equilibrium as symmetric information. In symmetric infor-
mation although wages are increasing in ability, the di¤erence between inside and
outside o¤ers is always  x: In the pooling equilibrium discussed above the dif-
ference between inside and outside wages will also be  x. The turnover rate
is increasing the in the di¤erence between the current and outside wage o¤ers.
Therefore turnover rates are the same in both the pooling equilibrium and full
information.
Proposition 4 Let a be the mean ability of the distribution F: There exists an
equilibrium that induces the same turnover rate for every ability type and expected
second period prot as the symmetric information model if and only if,
(aL   a+ x) [1 G (x   )]  max
w
(aL   w) [1 G (aH   w   )] : (1.16)
Further the wage policy wi(ai) = a  x is the unique wage policy for this equilib-
rium.
Proof. Direct application of Condition 1.
Proposition 4 discusses the uniqueness and existence of the fully pooling equi-
librium that achieves the same e¢ ciency levels as under symmetric information.
However, unlike full separation, this may not always be an equilibrium. The pool-
ing wage could potentially be too high to satisfy incentive compatibility when the
rm observes the lowest ability type. To see this, suppose the pooling wage is
higher than the marginal product of the lowest type. If the rm observes the
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lowest ability type it would never pay a wage greater than marginal product in the
second period. Therefore, this cannot be an equilibrium strategy for the lowest
ability type. In fact the condition on the pooling wage is even more strict. The
condition states that it can never be more protable for the rm to pay a lower
wage and signal the highest ability type than to pay the common wage.
Corollary 1 If the lowest ability type aL is su¢ ciently below the mean ability18,
then any equilibrium will induce lower expected prots for the rm and higher
turnover for some ability types than under symmetric information.
Proof. Direct application of Propositions 1 and 3.
Corollary 1 formalizes when asymmetric information will necessarily harm prof-
its and turnover in the second period. This is again when the spread of the ability
types is large enough that there is no pooling equilibrium.
I have shown that asymmetric information over worker ability can create ad-
ditional turnover ine¢ ciencies compared to symmetric information. Ironically
signaling ability increases turnover and lowers second period prots compared to
symmetric information. In the next section I show how formal pay systems can
improve turnover ine¢ ciencies and can thus be preferred by incoming workers.
1.4 Pay Systems
In this section I discuss how pay systems reduce turnover in the second period.
I have shown that the signaling and turnover aspect of wages can increase the
18The specic condition is (aL   a + x) [1 G (x   )] <
maxw (aL   w) [1 G (aH   w   )] :
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di¤erence between inside and outside wage o¤ers. Pay restrictions may be used to
restrict the rms ability to distort wages downward, thus improving second period
protability.
One possible solution to the wage signaling problem is to commit to make
any information about ability public (see Bar-Isaac, Jewitt and Leaver 2008).19
This would change the rms second period problem to be exactly the symmetric
information case. Although it is not the focus of this paper, it could also be an
interesting solution to this problem. However in certain cases, this solution may
also not be possible as information on worker ability may not be veriable.
In the following subsections I examine three di¤erent types of pay restrictions
that rms often employ. These pay systems can improve e¢ ciency through em-
ployee retention. Retention improves as second period wages are higher relative to
outside o¤ers. These restrictions are put in place prior to the rm observing the
ability of the worker. I show that these pay systems can improve e¢ ciency when
wages are a signal of ability. Since the model is competitive all e¢ ciency gains are
passed on to the worker at the beginning of the working relationship. Therefore
workers would prefer to work for rms that use one of these systems if it improves
future protability and future retention. However these restrictions may harm
e¢ ciency when information about worker ability is symmetric. In addition to
discussing e¢ ciency and second period protability of such policies I also discuss
testable distinguishing characteristics between the two information assumptions.
19In their paper the rm deals with a traditional adverse selection setting where private infor-
mation is valuable to the rm and there is no wage signaling. They look at the decision for rms
to make private information about workers public. The rm may choose to commit to give up
this information in the future if it helps attract new employees.
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1.4.1 Single Wages
Perhaps the most strict and glaring example of a pay system is what I refer to as
a single wage system. The most obvious example of this type of system is the
US federal governments GS system. Employees are paid a specied wage based
on experience and education. Pay increases are largely determined by tenure (see
Mace and Yoder 2009).
I now describe how this pay system can be incorporated into this model. The
rm chooses a second period wage prior to the worker accepting a job with that
rm. After the rm observes worker ability the rm is compelled to pay this wage
to all existing employees in the second period. The outside market again observes
this wage and makes a wage o¤er just as in the previous model.
Under wage signaling this pay system mirrors a fully pooling equilibrium from
the previous section except with much more exibility. All workers are paid the
same wage regardless of ability. By using this system the rm can guarantee
an average expected second period prot of any amount up to and including the
maximum of V : They may even be able to reduce turnover ine¢ ciencies lower
than in the symmetric information case. Even if such a fully pooling equilibrium
were possible in the wage signaling model equilibrium selection may be unclear.
Having the single wage prescribed beforehand allows the rm to commit to a good
equilibrium with certainty.
The single wage pay system can create a fully pooling equilibrium when it would
not exist otherwise. I have shown in Corollary 1 that if the ability dispersion is
too great there is no fully pulling equilibrium with a turnover rate less than or
equal to the turnover rate in the symmetric information case The limitation that
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causes this result is the incentive compatibility condition on the lowest ability type.
Under the single wage pay system it is assumed the rm can commit to pay all
employees the same wage even if it is not incentive compatible after observing
ability. Therefore the rm can credibly commit to a fully pooling equilibrium and
achieve higher prots.
Even though prot maximization is possible under this pay system the rm
will want to pay more than the prot maximizing wage. I have shown that a prot
maximizing wage of expected output minus x induces too much turnover from a
welfare standpoint. Recall that the market is competitive in the rst period and
all rents go to the employee. Therefore, the employees would prefer the rm to
commit to a wage that induced e¢ cient turnover. This wage would be exactly
the average output of the workers.
The benets of such a system are clear under asymmetric information and wage
signals. Just as with all pay systems I discuss in this paper, the value comes from
reducing the wage signaling problem. However, when worker ability is common
knowledge single wages can severely harm second period prots and alter turnover
through what I call reverse adverse selection. I now discuss the e¤ect of such a
system when information about worker ability is symmetric.
Proposition 5 If the rm commits to a single wage in the second period ( w)
and information on ability is symmetric, then turnover rates increase with ability.
Also the average ability of a worker who stays is less than of a worker who moves.
Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that when the rm pays a single wage to all of its employees
the outside market lures the more productive workers away with a higher wage.
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Lower ability workers have less compelling outside options and are more likely to
stay with the rm. As a result, the average ability of quitters is higher than
average ability for those who remain. This results in a sort of reverse adverse
selection where turnover happens disproportionately for the more able workers.
This case generates a di¤erent prediction than adverse selection models tested
by Gibbons and Katz (1991) and others.20 Symmetric information and single
wages predicts that workers displaced after a plant closing will have lower ability
than those who quit beforehand. Single wages under the wage signaling model
predicts no relationship between turnover probability and ability. Therefore the
average ability of the stayer and the quitter will be the same. The average ability
of a quitter and a worker who leaves because of a plant closing should be the same.
I have just discussed the value of a strict single wage system in overcoming the
wage signaling problem. However, in many instances, it may be impossible to
commit to this policy. If it is learned that some of the workers have a marginal
product below this wage the rm has an incentive to let that worker go. In the
single wage system, while average ability is above the single wage some ability
types are paid more than their marginal product. Once a worker is revealed to
have low ability, a rm may want to re the worker rather than keep the low ability
worker at the xed wage. The feasibility of the single wage system rests on the
commitment ability of the rm to not re. Unlike many rms the US Federal
Government may be able to maintain rigid enough bureaucracies to apply this
type of system.
In addition to the extreme rigidity of this system there is another reason why
this may be impractical. Although worker e¤ort is not modeled in this paper,
20Recall these adverse selection models predict that the ability of the workers who are laid o¤
is lower on average than ability for those who are terminated due to a plant closing.
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a single wage system would eliminate any incentives for a worker to exert e¤ort.
Just as in the fully pooling equilibrium discussed above, this single wage system
may induce perverse incentives to not work. The following pay systems still at
least partially negate the wage signaling problem while maintaining some wage
dispersion.
1.4.2 Pay Scales
Another common type of pay system is pay scales. These are ranges of pay that the
rm must stay within when o¤ering compensation to employees. The ranges are
usually tied to observables such as job assignment, rm tenure and/or experience.
As previously discussed the signaling role of wages reduces e¢ ciency through
high turnover. Since the fully separating equilibrium is unique any pay scale that
is narrower than this equilibrium wage prole must result in some pooling. I now
show how such pooling can improve welfare and can thus be preferred by potential
employees.
The model is identical to the one above except that the rm can now commit
to pay wages within a range [w^l; w^h] : The pay scale is chosen before period 1.
Once rms have chosen their pay scales and observed worker ability they play the
game just as in Section 1.3.2. I rst examine the e¤ect of pay scales when wages
signal ability. As before there is no unique partially pooling equilibrium to this
game. I narrow the new set of equilibria according to the following conditions.
These rules will uniquely dene the equilibrium wage prole given the pay scale.
Denition 2 Given a pay scale [w^l; w^h] the constrained separating equilibrium is
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an equilibrium with the following characteristics.
1) Any pooling happens at the extreme wages.
2) The average expected second period prot on the highest paid worker is at its
maximum.
The rst condition guarantees that this equilibrium somewhat resembles the
outcome of symmetric information.21 By restricting the equilibria where any
pooling occurs at the boundary I generate additional testable predictions distin-
guishing wage signaling from symmetric information. The second condition is
naturally satised by a fully separating equilibrium. This condition narrows the
equilibria to those more comparable to the fully separating equilibria. These two
conditions guarantee uniqueness of this type of equilibrium. Also if the upper
wage boundary is high enough and the lower wage boundary is low enough this
equilibrium is exactly the fully separating equilibrium.
The constrained separating equilibrium is determined from the top down. The
maximum wage o¤er determines the abilities pooled at the top and the separating
wages for the middle range. The minimum wage o¤er determines the ability types
that are o¤ered the lowest wage.
In showing the benet of pay scales I look at restrictions from the top and
the bottom separately. Starting from the fully separating equilibrium (i.e. w^h 
wi(aH) and w^l  wi(aL));I now show that reducing the maximal wage below the
highest fully separating wage (wi(aH)) improves prots.
21As in the earlier wage signaling model there may be partially pooling equilibria where multiple
ability types are o¤ered the same wage within the extreme wages. This internal clumping never
occurs when information on worker ability is symmetric. Therefore empirical evidence of such
clumping would support the wage signaling model but not the symmetric information model.
However observing no clumping within the pay scale would be inconclusive.
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Proposition 6 Compared to the fully separating equilibrium, there exists a range
of restrictive upper pay bounds (less than wi(aH)) that improve e¢ ciency through
reduced turnover.
Proof. In appendix.
The proof of Proposition 6 shows that turnover rates can be improved by upper
wage restrictions in two ways. First, reducing the maximal wage causes more
workers at the top of the ability distribution to have the have the second period
prot maximizing turnover rate. This lowest turnover is now expected on a larger
portion of the workforce. Second, increased pooling at the top reduces turnover
rates for all worker types through the individual compatibility restrictions. For
some small amount of pooling these constraints become more relaxed and the
equilibrium wages are higher for all workers. While some amount of pooling at
the top can improve this, if the upper pay restriction is too low, wage o¤ers on
some ability types may decrease. In this case, the workers who are not pooled
may have higher turnover than under full separation. That is, the rst e¤ect is
always welfare improving while the second e¤ect increases welfare for at least some
upper pay restrictions. Therefore there will always be some upper pay restriction
that improves e¢ ciency through lower turnover.
Now that I have shown that an upper pay boundary can improve prots I
examine the role of the lower pay restriction. The result in this case is not quite as
strong but it illustrates that such lower boundaries may be useful in some cases.
Proposition 7 Given any upper pay restriction (w^h) in a constrained separating
equilibrium, a lower pay restriction improves e¢ ciency if the distribution of ability
types receiving that wage has low enough variance.
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Proof. In appendix.
The e¢ ciency increases of Proposition 7 come from increasing the wages of
the lowest ability types. The separating equilibrium results in particularly high
turnover when the rm observes a low ability worker. This high turnover is caused
by low equilibrium wages relative to outside o¤ers. A lower bound on wages can
improve this problem through a commitment to pay higher wages on average. For
the average worker within this group, this wage will increase his wage and reduce
turnover ine¢ ciencies. However this pooled wage will also cause the highest ability
workers within that range to turnover more than they would otherwise. Because
there are both winners and losers, the wage restriction has an ambiguous e¤ect on
welfare without knowing more about the distribution of ability. We know that
the separating wage prole is convex meaning that wages increase with ability at
a faster rate for higher ability workers. Decreases in e¢ ciency in high ability
workers from the pooled wage can a¤ect total ine¢ ciencies more than the turnover
reduction for low ability workers. However if the ability distribution is su¢ ciently
tight about the mean within this group, then such wage restrictions will improve
welfare.
Pay Scales with Symmetric information.
Now I examine the e¤ect of pay scales when worker ability is observed by the
outside market. In this case, I show that the current rm no longer has the
tendency to distort the wage o¤er away from prot maximization. Any binding
pay restriction such as pay scales results in lower second period prots. Evidence of
symmetric information when there are pay scales is found through the relationship
between turnover rates and wages.
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Proposition 8 If there is symmetric information about worker ability, any upper
wage w^h < ah x results in a range of abilities being o¤ered that wage [w^h+x; aH ].
Further, average turnover rates are higher and expected second period prots are
lower on such workers. Similarly, any lower wage w^l > aL  x results in a range
of abilities being o¤ered that wage [aL; w^L + x]. Average turnover rates and
expected second period prots are lower on such workers.
Proposition 8 shows the e¤ect of a binding restriction in the absence of wage
signaling and turnover. Just as traditional labor theory suggests, such restrictions
change the turnover rates for the workers whose wages are changed under these
restrictions. If the unconstrained optimal wage is not available under the pay scale,
the rm chooses the closest feasible o¤er. The highest (lowest) ability workers
are paid the upper (lower) wage boundary. Compared to prot maximizing, the
highest (lowest) ability workers are paid too little (much) and quit more (less)
frequently resulting in lower prots. Since turnover rates are already ine¢ ciently
high, it is possible that lower pay restrictions may improve welfare. Again, since
all rents are given to the worker, such restrictions may be preferred by incoming
employees. Upper pay restrictions further reduce welfare and are not preferred by
the workers.
Now that I have determined the characteristics of pay scales under both cases
I now examine the distinguishing features of the two models. Without looking at
the turnover rates the wage prole for the symmetric and the asymmetric can look
quite similar. In both cases, restrictive pay scales result in pooling at the extreme
wages. Determining which of these models best describe the real world is done
though examining turnover rates at and within the extreme wages.
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The wage signaling model predicts turnover rates decrease with the wage whether
or not there is clumping at the extreme wages. That is, turnover rates are highest
for the lowest paid workers and lowest for the highest paid workers. Also turnover
rates are negatively correlated with wages for workers in between the extreme
wages.
The turnover predictions for the symmetric information model are quite di¤er-
ent. The symmetric information model predicts that turnover rates are uncorre-
lated with the wage if there is no clumping at the boundary. If there is clumping
at the highest wage, then turnover rates at the high wage are higher than for other
workers. If there is clumping at the lowest wage, the turnover rates at the low
wage are lower than for the other workers. Therefore the two models generate
vastly di¤erent predictions on how pay scales a¤ect turnover rates at the high and
low wages.
The limited empirical work on pay systems seams to show that upper pay
bounds do not adversely a¤ect turnover. Gibbs and Hendricks(2004) analyze a
single rm that used a pay scale system. They nd evidence of clumping at the
high end of the wage scale while no evidence of increased turnover at the maximal
wage o¤er. This nding is consistent with the asymmetric information and wage
signals, but not with symmetric information.
1.4.3 Budgets
Another common pay restriction is the use of budgets (see Merchant and Manzoni
1989, and Hansen and Van der Stede 2004). Here the governing body of the
organization sets expenditure restrictions on lower managers. The lower managers
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then have the discretion to allocate the funds among employees.22 Examining the
role of budgets is a huge topic within the eld of accounting (ex. Demski and
Fetham 1978, and Shih 1998). This literature is largely based on principle-agent
problems between the rm and lower level managers. The underlying theme of
this previous work is that budgets allow the rm more control over the internal
workings of the rm. The motivation for using budgets in this paper is very
di¤erent and complementary to the vast work in the accounting literature. In this
paper, I argue that rms may use budgets as a commitment device against itself
rather than to induce optimal behavior from an agent. I then show that these
same types of budgets harm protability when information on worker ability is
common knowledge.
I start with the same assumptions as in the simple wage signal model (Section
1.3.2) with a few exceptions. First, I introduce managers into this game. Each
new employee i is assigned to a manager in the rst period. For each set of new
employees a manager is given n  1 new workers with abilities drawn i.i.d. from
distribution F . After the rst period of work the manager observes ability and
chooses wages for the workers under his span of control for the second period. The
objective for a manager is slightly di¤erent than the rms. Instead of choosing
wages to maximize prot, the manager is maximizing total expected output subject
to a budget constraint. This budget constraint is set by the rm. In this model
I have set the budget constraint as restricting the maximum expected combined
wages of the group under the managers span of control. The manager must set
wages so that on average, the combined wages must fall below some maximum.23
22There may be other reasons not modeled in this paper why a rm would want to use bud-
geting. Even so, this paper generates testable implications of the e¤ect of the budget restriction
on turnover rates.
23An alternative assumption might be a restriction on total wages o¤ered rather than expected
wages accepted by workers. This restriction does not change the results of the wage signaling
model, but it can have some e¤ect under symmetric information. The restriction as presented in
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That is after observing the draw of abilities a1; ::; an the manager chooses wages
to solve,8><>:
max
w1;::;wn
ni=1ai [1 G (bi (w1; ::; wn)  wi   )]
st ni=1wi [1 G (bi (w1; ::; wn)  wi   )]  K
9>=>; : (1.17)
Again, consistency requires that the beliefs associated with a wage o¤er bi(:)
must be the expected ability of a type receiving that wage o¤er. I also assume
that if the wage o¤ers of any two employees are switched then the beliefs about
their productivity switches as well.24
One option for the rm setting the budget restriction is to set the budget to
maximize expected second period prots. Under wage signaling it is possible to
get an equilibrium that is very similar to full information. This is done is by
setting the wage equal to the expected wage bill of the group if information was
symmetric.
Proposition 9 If the rm sets a budget K = n (a  x) ; then there exists equilib-
ria that induce the same expected prots as under symmetric information. How-
ever there may be other equilibria that do not.
Proposition 9 shows us that using budgets allow for equilibria where the rm
achieves maximal prots in the second period. This is because the person setting
the wage no longer has the incentive to reduce costs below the budget restriction.
the paper is the easier to interpret and generates cleaner and more realistic predictions.
24This guarantees that in equilibrium wages will be increasing with ability. To see that this
must be true assume that the opposite is possible. If given two ability types a higher ability
worker also has a higher turnover rate in equilibrium, the managers can switch the employees
wages and gain more expected prots.
34
In staying within budget, the manager is concerned with the signaling role of the
wage o¤er. But now there exists equilibria where any equilibrium wage o¤er in-
duces the same turnover probability. Therefore the manager is indi¤erent between
wage o¤ers as long as he stays within budget.
The equilibria that induce maximal expected prots are not unique. However,
they have some important common characteristics. In any such equilibria, the
turnover probability is the optimal G (x   ) for all possible equilibrium wages.
This imposes a restriction on the wage policy. For any wage o¤ered in equilibrium,
the expected ability of a worker o¤ered that wage must be x higher than that wage.
This is now possible in equilibrium since turnover rates are the same regardless of
the wage o¤er. In this equilibrium, the manager has no incentive to distort the
wage o¤er. The wage prole must set wages in a way that expends the entire
budget while signaling ability. One possible equilibrium is the perfect pooling
equilibrium of all workers o¤ered a  x. In this equilibrium the expected ability
of any worker receiving that wage would be the mean of the ability distribution.
Another prot maximizing equilibrium is for each worker to be paid x less than
his ith order statistic. In this equilibrium the manager observes ability and orders
workers on ability from 1 to n: Then the manager pays each worker i x less
than the expected ability ith order statistic from a random draw of n. As a result
the outside belief of the ith highest wage o¤er is exactly the expected ith order
statistic. Both of these wage proles are an equilibrium that induces maximal
expected prot.
Even though second period prot maximization is possible workers would pre-
fer the rm to set the budget even higher to maximize e¢ ciency. This budget
restriction would be the expected combined marginal product of the group. The
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equilibrium would work the same as above only without subtracting x:
The use of budgets is an example of how centralizing to some extent the wage
setting decision can improve protability. By taking the incentive to underpay
employees away from the decision maker, the rm is able avoid excessive turnover.
One major criticism of strict formal pay systems is that such systems lack the
exibility necessary to react to the outside market. Under asymmetric information
and wage signals I have shown such rigidity makes pay systems valuable. How-
ever, as I show next, under symmetric worker information rigid budgets reduce
protability no matter how well executed. This lack of exibility causes workers
to be either over or under paid compared to the optimal wage.
I now analyze this model under the assumption of symmetric information on
worker ability. All other assumptions are the same. Since the wage no longer
acts as a signal the problem now becomes,8><>:
max
w1;::;wn
ni=1ai [1 G (ai   wi   )]
st ni=1wi [1 G (ai   wi   )]  K
9>=>; : (1.18)
The solution to this problem will depend on the realized ability level of the n
workers assigned to the manager as well as the budget constraint.
Proposition 10 If ability is common knowledge strict budgets reduce the average
expected second period prot on workers.
Proof. In Appendix
Proposition 10 shows that under symmetric information any such budget re-
striction lowers expected prots. This result comes from the assumption that the
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budget choice is made prior to the realization of abilities. A budget that is not
determined perfectly results in either too much turnover or wages that are too
high. Either e¤ect reduces expected rm prots. It is possible for the budget
to be the perfect size so that expected prots are at their maximum. This would
depend on the realization of abilities of the workers. Because budgets are set
before observing ability, the probability that the rm sets the budget perfectly is
zero. Any attempt to set budget restrictions results in lower expected prots for
the rm.
I have shown how the inexibility of the budgets can harm rm prots. I now
examine how such budget restrictions a¤ect worker turnover and compensation.
This provides a testable implication on the e¤ect of budgets on worker turnover.
Corollary 2 Turnover probabilities of all workers in a unit increase when the
average ability of workers within that unit increases for any budget restriction.
Also, wages and turnover rates for higher ability workers are a¤ected more by the
di¤erence in the sum of unrestricted wages and the budget restriction.
Proof. In Appendix
Corollary 2 explains the e¤ect on wages when the actual budget does not match
the realized abilities of the group members. When the budget is too high then
wages for all workers increase and turnover decreases. When wages are too low,
then all workers take a pay cut and turnover for all workers is lower. It also states
that the e¤ect is greater for higher ability workers.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. If the budget is high compared to
combined worker ability, the managers main concern is improving expected output
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through retention. As a result the manager increases his retention e¤orts on all
workers. He is particularly worried about retaining his most productive workers.
If the budget is low, the manager is primarily concerned with wage reduction.
All workers receive lower wages. However, the highest ability workers are also
the highest paid. Lowering the highest wages and increasing turnover rates has
the greatest e¤ect on reducing expected wage costs. Therefore the higher ability
workers are a¤ected more by the budget than the lower ability workers.
Although budget restrictions will always reduce second period prots they may
improve e¢ ciency if set high enough. The unrestricted full information wage
prole still induces ine¢ ciently high turnover. This ine¢ ciency may be reduced
if the budget causes wages to be closer to marginal product. However maximum
e¢ ciency is not attainable due to the randomness in realized worker ability.25
As noted above the e¤ect of budgets on turnover rates have di¤erent predictions
depending on the information structure of worker ability. I now suggest tests that
can distinguish a symmetric information result from wage signaling. Under wage
signaling, budgets can cause turnover probabilities to be the same across ability
types. Therefore one worker quitting has no predictive power on other quits within
that group. In symmetric information, a quit signals that the budget is too small
for the ability stock. Therefore quits will be correlated for workers within the
span of a manager. Another prediction of this model is that the quit rates of
higher ability workers are a¤ected more by the relative budget size compared to
ability stock. This means that quitting tendencies are more strongly correlated
for higher paid workers.
25Maximum e¢ ciency only occurs if the inside and outside wages are the same. With symmetric
information, the outside wage is always equal to marginal product. But, since the budget is
determined before the realization of ability for the ability of the group the budget will always be
either too high or too low to induce the e¢ cient turnover rate.
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1.5 Discussion
Information plays a crucial role in this turnover model. I have examined the
turnover model separately for wages as signals of ability and under symmetric
information. There is another possible information assumption that I now discuss.
That assumption is that neither the current rm wage o¤er nor worker ability are
observed by the outside rms.
In this case the wage o¤er has no signaling role. All workers are o¤ered the
same outside wage o¤er regardless of their ability or current rm wage o¤er. In
this case, the inside rm o¤ers a higher wage to its more productive employees
to reduce turnover on its highest producers. Since turnover is higher for lower
ability workers the average ability of workers who quit is lower than for workers
who do not. The single outside wage o¤er reects the lower expected ability of
the worker who quits. Since workers on average expect to receive a lower wage in
the outside market, few workers move rms. This model is closely related to the
existing literature on adverse selection in the labor market. Therefore I refer to
this model as adverse selection.
Depending on the observability of ability and wage o¤ers there are three models.
They are symmetric information, wage signals, and adverse selection. While there
are similarities, I now suggest some empirical tests to distinguish between these
three models in the absence of formal pay systems. The rst test is whether wages
are correlated with turnover probability. The symmetric information model is the
only one of these models where wages are not correlated with turnover rates. In
the other two models turnover and the wage o¤er are negatively related. The
second test is whether pre quit wage o¤ers are correlated with post quit o¤ers.
In both the symmetric information and wage signaling model pre quit wage o¤ers
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predict outside rm wage o¤ers. For adverse selection, wages and productivity at
the current rm are unobserved by the market and do not predict outside wage
o¤ers.
In summary the correlation between turnover rates and wages give evidence
on the information structure of the labor market. In the absence of formal pay
systems, if wages are uncorrelated with turnover this suggests symmetric informa-
tion. Current rm wages that are correlated with turnover probability as well as
outside o¤ers support wage signaling. If current rm wage o¤ers are correlated
with turnover but not correlated with outside wage o¤ers this suggests adverse
selection.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I attempt to explain a possible reason for why rms use formal pay
restrictions. I argue that formal pay systems can help the rm to become more
attractive to potential employees. Pay systems allow the rm to commit to wage
proles in order to reduce the losses associated with excessive turnover. I have also
shown how these pay systems may be harmful or helpful under di¤erent information
assumptions. In addition I have generated various empirical predictions depending
on the information structure and the various pay systems considered.
I argue that reducing excess employee turnover is an important new avenue
for welfare improvement. If these pay systems indeed reduce ine¢ cient levels of
turnover, it is important for employers to understand such contracts. This wage
policy would allow the labor market to respond to market forces yet fully benet
from individual workers tastes. While I have discussed three distinct types, a
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more complete description and analysis of all possible wage systems would likely
provide further insight.
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CHAPTER 2
TURNOVER AND PROMOTION
2.1 Introduction
Employee turnover has been of great importance to the business world and econo-
mists for some time. A vast theoretical and empirical literature has been developed
to understand labor mobility. Similarly, the last few decades have seen an increased
e¤ort to try to understand the issue of job assignment. While employee promotion
and turnover have been studied separately, this paper is among the rst to exam-
ine the relationship between these issues. A number of empirical studies suggest
a negative relationship between turnover and promotion (see Carson et al. 1994;
Saporta and Fajourn 2003). To our knowledge, no theoretical work has examined
this relationship. Using a simple, intuitive, yet largely unexplored turnover process,
we explain this and other established stylized facts relating to job assignment.
Our turnover mechanism also explains what has been an important disconnect
between economic theory and business practice. Employee turnover is a serious
matter for rms. Firms often hire consulting groups to help manage employee
retention or the cost of employee turnover.Explicitly these turnover costs include
search costs, training costs, setup costs, etc. These costs can be substantial even
for the lowest paid worker.1 While turnover has been examined in many contexts,
current economic theories have di¢ culty justifying the heed given to employee
retention.2 Our turnover process provides a theoretical basis to the idea of the
1For example, in their study of four di¤erent hotels Hinkin and Tracy (2000) estimate the
turnover cost of a front-desk associate to be from 5 to 12 thousand dollars. Over half of this
gure is non-explicit productivity costs. See also Cascio (1999) and Wasmuth and Davis
(1983) for additional examples of costs of employee turnover.
2Under traditional theories, when countero¤ers are possible, the rm will never allow a worker
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cost of employee turnover.
The source of turnover in our model is (rm and time specic) private random
utility shocks experienced by the worker.3 The current employer is able to exploit
these shocks through wage o¤ers that are below the employees marginal product.
Therefore, the employer captures rent from the worker as long as the worker enjoys
working at the rm. If the worker receives a shock that is low enough, it will quit
the rm and work elsewhere. When workers leave the current rm, this creates a
loss in current and future expected prots. We interpret the loss in current and
future expected prots as the cost of turnover.
Another (somewhat less important, yet instructive) element of this model is
switching costs. These represent moving expenses, emotional stress or other costs
associated with changing employers. These costs allow for a more realistic level
of turnover as well as a way to examine how di¤erent turnover rates a¤ect the
promotion decision.
In order to isolate the e¤ects of these mechanisms we rst build an innite-
horizon model with only one job assignment. We assume that workers are equally
productive at all rms and that this productivity is common knowledge. After a
period of work the worker observes his taste for the following year. Since the worker
only has information about the current rm, the current rm can capture rent from
to leave before o¤ering him a wage equal to his marginal product. If workers are paid their
marginal product, turnover of a single worker will not a¤ect the rms protability. Under some
restrictive assumptions, existing theory can generate endogenous turnover while rms pay a wage
below marginal product. For example, a model with random outside wage o¤ers that assumes
away countero¤ers may have this feature (see, Munasinghe and OFlaherty 2005). However,
assuming away countero¤ers does not seem to be the a realistic approach to this question.
3These shocks have a natural interpretation. They are the various non-pay aspects of a job
whose importance to the worker is unknown to the rm. We assume that these shocks change
over time. Workers can only predict future shocks for their current employer one period ahead.
Since the worker has information about the current employer, the current employer is able to
exert a kind of monopsonistic power over the employee.
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the workers private information. This is done by a lower wage o¤er. Each period,
the current rm o¤ers a wage below marginal product. If the realized taste shock
is high enough to compensate for the lower wage o¤er the worker remains with the
current rm. If the realized taste shock is too low, it switches employers. Once
the employee leaves his current rm, that rm loses claim to all current and future
prots from that employee.
We see from this simple model that private worker tastes generate a prot
stream for the current employer. Because current rms are able to capture future
rents, rms will be willing to pay up front incentives to establish a relationship
with new employees. This explains large wage increases associated with switching
jobs as well as signing bonuses and other up-front payments made at the beginning
of the match.
We later extend this model into a simplied Gibbons andWaldman (1999, 2006)
framework of job assignment.4 The worker starts his life more productive at the
low level job. Over time, the worker becomes increasingly more productive at the
higher job. We assume that there is a one-time general training or learning-by-
doingcost associated with promotion (see Brown 1989, Gathmann and Schonberg
2007, Shaw and Lazear 2007, and Dohmen 2004 for empirical evidence consistent
with this assumption). If the current rm does the training, the worker has the
ability to change employers immediately after the rm pays the training costs. If
the current rm doesnt promote, the outside rms can o¤er promotion to attract
the potential employee.
In equilibrium, an employer wants to maintain its relationship with its current
4In order to isolate the promotion, turnover and wage dynamics we abstract away from the
learning elements of the Gibbons and Waldman framework. We assume that worker productivity
is deterministic and common knowledge.
44
workers to extract the aforementioned rents over time. However, the rm is also
concerned with paying the up-front cost of training without a guarantee of the
worker staying with the rm. As a result, the rm will delay promotion past the
point that it is rst-best optimal. The outside rms will start o¤ering promotions
before the inside rm. Because the worker becomes increasingly more productive
at the higher job, the outside wage o¤ers improve relative to the current-rm wage
o¤er. The workers turnover probability increases during this time. Eventually
the strain of the outside markets wage o¤er induces the inside rm to also o¤er
promotion (and a large pay increase) to its loyal employee. Once the worker is
o¤ered promotion (either from the current rm or not) his subsequent turnover
probabilities fall to their lowest level. Therefore, we suggest that the decreased
turnover at promotion comes from an alleviation (of outside market pressures)
that happens at promotion.
In addition to explaining the negative relationship between turnover and pro-
motion we generate a large set of well established stylized facts regarding turnover,
promotion and wage dynamics. In setting up our model, we assume away many
traditional explanations used to explain these various established stylized facts
(such as, asymmetric information on ability types, learning, or contracts). We do
not claim these other forces are unimportant. However, we claim that this new
class of labor market models can explain new stylized facts while being consistent
with established patterns in the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
current literature that relates to this paper. Section 3 presents a simple model
that introduces the turnover mechanism. Section 4 examines this model with job
assignment. In section 5 we outline an extension that incorporates a continual ele-
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ment of the workers taste for the rm. We discuss the implications and alternative
explanations in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature review
The last three decades have produced a great deal of research designed to help
understand the relationship between the worker and the rm. This paper is among
a small set of personnel economics models that take important earlier models5
(ex. Becker 1962, Lazear and Rosen 1981, Rosen 1982, Greenwald 1986, Gibbons
and Waldman 1999) and incorporate private worker taste (or disutility) shocks.
These new models use this turnover mechanism to generate more realistic wage
and turnover predictions (ex. Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Barron and Berger
2006, Schonberg 2007, Ghosh 2007). I also use this mechanism in the other two
chapter of this dissertation. In both chapters 1 and 3 I examine rm policies and
their relation to turnover e¢ ciency. In Chapter 1, I discuss formal pay systems.
In chapter 3, I consider employee bonding.
The work of Ghosh (2007) is the paper most similar to this chapter. He adds
the turnover mechanism to a three period Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006)
framework. His model naturally produces many of the same results as Gibbons
and Waldman. In addition he shows that rm specic human capital accumulation
creates a negative relationship between rm tenure and turnover.
Although built on the same framework, our paper di¤ers from Ghosh in a num-
ber of important ways. First, and most importantly, his paper does not examine
5Another notable work that is less relevant to this paper is Harris and Holmstroms (1982)
discussion on insurance.
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the relationship between turnover and promotion. Our results largely stem from
our assumption of job (or task) specic training costs. Further discussion will be
included later in the paper. Second, we abstract away from the learning elements
of the Gibbons and Waldman framework. Third we use an innite horizon model.
This feature is absent in all the aforementioned disutilityshock based turnover
modes. Assuming an innite-horizon helps to disentangle the e¤ects of promotion,
tenure, learning, etc. on wage dynamics from end of lifee¤ects.6
One of our key predictions in this paper is the negative relationship between
turnover and promotion. In the eld of psychology a large empirical literature
argues that promotion satisfactionor promotion opportunitiesreduce turnover
rates (ex. Cotton and Tuttle 1986). However Carson et al. (1994) use a meta-
analysis on numerous such studies and show that actual promotion rather than
promotion satisfactionor promotion opportunitiesreduces turnover. Similarly,
Saporta and Fajourn (2003) used longitudinal data on a single rm and found a
similar result. They found that the number of promotions reduced turnover rates
for both professional and managerial workers.
In addition to predictions on turnover we also generate a well established re-
lationship between wage and promotion. Particularly, compensation is largely
associated with job assignment (ex., Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 1994).
This is not the rst theoretical work to generate this prediction. Early the-
oretical work assumes that jobs can be ordered by their responsiveness to ability
(see, Rosen 1982, Waldman 1984b). Jobs in which productivity depends more on
6Firms will pay more to keep (or hire) an employee if that employee will provide future rents.
The worker will remain with the current rm for a lower wage if future expected utility is higher
(relative to outside option). That is, future prot raises the current wage o¤er. Future worker
utility lowers the current wage o¤er. In a nite horizon model, the concern for the future is not
the same in all periods. The wage decision will be di¤erent depending on the number of periods
remaining. We avoid these complications by using an innite horizon model.
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ability will be lled by more able workers. The wage distribution becomes more
skewed than the ability distribution due to comparative advantages (see, Sattinger
1975). The ordering of jobs alone does not su¢ ciently explain the wage premium
at promotion. Asymmetric information, (e.g., Waldman 1984a, Bernhardt 1995)
learning, (see, Gibbons and Waldman 1999) and tournaments (see, Lazear and
Rosen 1981) all provide valuable insights. However, none of them address non-
degenerate turnover.
In our paper, turnover is a key element and is modeled in a novel way. Al-
though less relevant to this paper there is a vast literature that discusses other
types of turnover mechanisms. These papers on job search and matching give
us valuable insights into the turnover process (ex. Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b; Bur-
dett 1978). In these models, turnover is a result of economic agents attempting
to improve expected match quality. Imperfect information and learning gradually
change worker and rm matches over time.
While these models are able to generate a number of empirical predictions they
do not discuss why rms are concerned with attracting and keeping individual
employees. When it is assumed that workers are paid their marginal product (ex.
Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b) there is no real loss to the rm when the worker leaves.
Another popular assumption is that workers are given a xed proportion of their
match specic rent (ex. Mortensen 1978). Under this assumption, rms do incur
an economic loss when the worker switches employers. However the assumption of
a xed sharing rule of the match specic rent is often not realistic. In many real
world settings (where wages are not xed), a rm would give up additional rents
to retain a worker. In models of this sort that allow for counter-o¤ers, the cost of
employee turnoveris still unexplained.
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Another key element in this paper is the required training at a change in job as-
signment. In addition to formal training, this may also be interpreted as learning-
by-doing. The task specic training or learning-by-doing is similar to Gibbons
and Waldmans (2004, 2006) discussion on task specic human capital.7 The
learning-by-doing interpretation is compelling as there is ample empirical evidence
to support it in many cases. (see Brown 1989, Dohmen 2004, Gathmann and
Schonberg 2007 and Shaw and Lazear 2007)
Although training is task specic in this model, we assume that it is transferable
between rms. The seminal work by Becker (1962) argues that the costs and
rewards of general skills training are entirely born by the worker himself. Recent
empirical studies (ex. Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998, and Manchester 2008) show
that rms do provide non trivial general skills training. In fact Loewenstein and
Spletzer (1998) nd that rm sponsored general training increases wages. While
Manchester (2008) shows that general training lowers turnover rates.
A number of works try to explain why rms may in fact o¤er such training
(see Katz and Ziderman 1990, Chang and Wang 1996, and Acemoglu and Pischke
1998 and 1999). Katz and Ziderman (1990), and Chang and Wang (1996) look at
asymmetric information in relation to general training.8 Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998 and 1999) also discuss the asymmetric information friction as well as labor
unions and complementarities with rm specic human capital. They argue that
such frictions compressthe labor market wage prole compared to the distribution
of marginal product. This compression allows rms the ability to capture some of
the returns to training. Our model lacks these types of labor market frictions. We
7Other theoretical models of learning-by-doing include Arrow (1962) and Hirsch (1956). Both
models focus on the investment aspects of learning-by-doing and not the promotion decision.
8Chang and Wang (1996) argue that asymmetric info on training levels will lower actual
general skills training levels. Katz and Ziderman (1990) argue that such asymmetries increase
training.
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suggest an additional complimentary reason why the rm engages in such practices.
2.3 The Turnover Mechanism
In this section we introduce the turnover mechanism that drives our later results.
We develop intuition on the source of turnover costs and the rents associated with
attracting and retaining individual workers. We assume that worker productivity
is full information and place little structure on its dynamics in this preliminary
model. In the following section, we add structure to productivity dynamics as we
examine how turnover relates to job assignment.
2.3.1 Simple Model
There is free entry into production. All rms are identical. The only input is
labor and it is inelasticly supplied each period. A workers career lasts for innite
periods. All rms and workers have a common discount factor of  2 (0; 1):
Worker i0s marginal product at time t is denoted as ai;t 2 R++: All information
about productivity is common knowledge.
Worker is utility consists of current wages, a taste shock and a switching cost
  0 (if incurred). The switching cost is incurred only when the worker switches
employers. Worker i0s taste shock for rm k at time t is denoted as ki;t and is private
information for the worker. All 0s are drawn independently from a commonly
known continuously di¤erentiable distribution G. The distribution G has a zero
mean and a continuously di¤erentiable density g: The hazard rate H(:) = g(:)
1 G(:)
is non-decreasing on its support. To ensure that turnover is sometimes e¢ cient,
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we restrict the inmum of the support of G to be <  . the worker cannot
predict his taste shock for any future period. Further, the only period t taste
shock worker i knows is for his current rm:9 Throughout this paper we refer to
worker is current rm at time t (denoted as ki;t) as the rm where worker i was
employed at time t  1: The outside rms for worker i at time t are all other rms
except the current rm. We denote Uki;t+1 as worker i
0s expected future utility if
he works for rm k in period t: If worker i accepts a wage wki;ti;t from his current
employer at time t, his utility is,
ut = w
ki;t
i;t + 
ki;t
i;t + U
ki;t
i;t+1: (2.1)
The worker incurs the same switching costs for all outside rms. If he decides
to leave the current rm, and accepts a wage wki;t with rm k 6= ki;t his expected
utility at t is,
ut = w
k
i;t    + U ki;t+1: (2.2)
If worker i accepts a wage o¤er from an outside rm, he will choose the rm that
maximizes this expression. We assume that, if indi¤erent the worker remains with
the current rm. Therefore, the worker will stay with his current employer if,
w
ki;t
i;t + 
ki;t
i;t + U
ki;t
i;t+1  wki;t    + U ki;t+1 for all k 6= ki;t (2.3)
Recall that the worker only has knowledge of his taste shock for the rm that he
worked for in the previous period (t   1). The worker only knows this value for
the current period (t) and not beyond. Therefore the only di¤erence in expected
utility between the inside and outside options will occur in the current period i.e.
9We have not yet explicitly dened the outside option for the worker. It seems natural
that wages should be greater than zero. In order to avoid uninteresting corner solutions or
negative wages we impose the restriction that for each period ai;t > x (where x uniquely solves
x g(x
 )
1 G(x ) = 1). However, if we instead allow negative wages and assume that there is no
outside option the results of the model are unchanged.
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U
k
i;t+1 = U
ki;t
i;t+1 for all t and k: If worker i enters the outside market, he will accept
the highest outside rm wage o¤er wi;t:
The employment decision of worker i at t reduces substantially. The worker
will remain with his current employer if,
w
ki;t
i;t + 
ki;t
i;t  wi;t   :
The worker will leave the current rm with probability,
Pr(w
ki;t
i;t + 
ki;t
i;t  wi;t   ) = 1 G( wi;t   wki;ti;t   ): (2.4)
The payo¤ for the rm is simply the marginal product of its employees minus
the wage costs. A rms wage decision for a given worker i, depends on whether
the rm is worker is current rm or not. Since rms are identical, we restrict our
analysis to symmetric equilibria. To ease notation we drop the superscript ki;t.10
At the beginning of each period, the current rm gives a wage o¤er to worker
i. The worker decides to accept the o¤er or enter the outside market. Bertrand
like competition in the outside market forces zero expected prots for the winning
outside rm. Therefore the highest wage o¤er ( wit) will be equal to the current
marginal product of the worker plus the expected discounted rent of being the
current rm in period t+ 1.
The denition of equilibrium that we use is symmetric Markov Perfect Nash
Equilibria. In this model it means that a rms actions and payo¤ depends on
worker age and whether it is the current rm. This translates into three basic
conditions for each period. First, the current rms wage o¤er must maximize prof-
its. Second, the rents of being the current rm are the expected present discounted
10In doing so we lose some information about the exact employment history of the worker.
However, we are still able to discuss when he switches employers and his wage dynamics.
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value of worker is product minus his wages at that rm. Third, the outside wage
o¤er must ensure expected zero prots for the winning rm. We dene these
conditions formally below.
Denition 3 The equilibrium of this economy is a series of current rm wages
fwi;tg ; outside wages f wi;tg ; and expected prots fVi;tg such that 8t
1. wi;t 2 arg maxw (ai;t + Vi;t+1   w) [1 G( wi;t   w   )] (Prot Maximization)
2 Vi;t = maxw (ai;t + Vi;t+1   w) [1 G( wi;t   w   )] (Expected Prots)
3 wi;t = ai;t + Vi;t+1 (Zero Prot for Outside Firms)
We now solve for the equilibrium of this game. Substituting the Zero Prot
condition into the Prot Maximization condition we get,
Vi;t = max
w
(at + Vi;t+1   w) [1 G( wi;t   w   )] (2.5)
= max
xi;t
(xi;t) [1 G(xi;t   )] where xi;t = ai;t + Vi;t+1   w: (2.6)
x is the ex post rent that a rm receives from the worker staying for another
period. We see that the optimal value of x is tied directly to the distribution of
:
The rst order condition of (2.6) in terms of xi;t; are,
xi;t =
1 G(xi;t   )
g(xi;t   ) =
1
H(xi;t   ) : (2.7)
Recall that the hazard rate g
1 G is non-decreasing. The objective function is
quasi-concave so the rst order condition is necessary,11 su¢ cient and has a unique
11xi;t  0 cannot solve the maximization problem since positive prots are possible. Therefore
the solution to the maximization problem must be on the open set (0;1): If the maximum exists
it must satisfy the rst order condition.
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solution. Let x solve the rst order condition (2.7). Since the distribution of
the s are stationary, the equilibrium satises xi;t = x every period. From (2.5)
and (2.6) we know that Vi;t must also be stationary.
Vi;t = max
w
(at + Vi;t+1   w) [1 G( wi;t   w   )] (2.8)
= x [1 G(x   )] = V  for all t: (2.9)
Plugging the stationary V 0s and x0s into our equilibrium denition 3 we have
the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 11 The unique equilibrium of the above economy is
wi;t = ai;t + V
   x (2.10)
wi;t = ai;t + V
 (2.11)
Vi;t = V
 (2.12)
turnover probability = G(x   ): 8t (2.13)
The economic cost of employee turnover = x [1   (1 G(x   ))] > 0:(2.14)
Proof. above
Proposition 11 gives us the turnover probabilities and wage o¤ers for worker is
lifetime. The stationarity of this result comes from the stationary nature of the
taste shock : The probability of turnover each period is always G(x ): Worker
is wages are his marginal product shifted by one of two constants depending
on whether he switched employers that period. Now that we have solved this
preliminary model we discuss some important aspects of the solution.
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2.3.2 Wage gains at voluntary turnover
Once the worker has been employed for one period, the current rm o¤ers a wage
below marginal product.
wi;t = ai;t + V
   x = ai;t + x [ (1 G(x   ))  1] < ai;t: (2.15)
Since the worker stays with positive probability, this creates a positive expected
prot for the current rm. When hired by a new rm, the discounted value of these
expected future prots are part of a workers wage. This causes a wage premium
when the worker switches rms. The wage premium in this model can also be
interpreted as signing bonuses, moving reimbursement etc.
It has long been observed that voluntary turnover is associated with wage
gains (ex DePasquale and Lange 1971, Topel and Ward 1992). This is not the
rst theoretical paper to generate this result. For example, Greenwald (1986)
shows that expected future rents from asymmetric information can increase wages
at turnover above expected marginal product.12
2.3.3 Cost of Turnover
A workers knowledge about his feelings toward his current rm creates rents for
that rm. When worker i leaves his current rm, the rm loses all claims to future
rents from that worker. Proposition 1 gives us the economic loss of the rm relative
to worker i staying with the rm. We now discuss why rms will be willing to
incur such a loss without increasing wages up to the workers marginal product.
12In his model new employers anticipate future information rent as ability is learned by only
the new rm. The competitive market causes such rents to be appropriated to the worker at the
beginning of the relationship.
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The decision to quit for the worker is driven by relative wage o¤ers as well as the
realization of the taste shock. Since the workers tastes are private information the
current rm doesnt know exactly how much rent it can extract from the worker.
The rm balances the turnover e¤ects of o¤ering a low wage with the prot of
retaining an employee at a low wage. If the current rm were to increase its
wage o¤er above the equilibrium wage the worker would be more likely to stay.
However by so doing the rm would reduce his expected prots (since equilibrium
wage o¤ers were chosen optimally). In essence, knowledge of the worker about the
current rm creates rents for the current rm. Asymmetric information between
worker and rm induces turnover and wage o¤ers that lie below the marginal
product.13
2.3.4 E¢ cient turnover
The e¢ cient turnover rule for this model is that the worker should switch employers
whenever the taste parameter is less than minus the switching cost (ki;ti;t <  ). An
economy where the current rm and the worker know the workers taste parameter
would result in this rule.14 However under asymmetric information the worker will
switch rms whenever ki;ti;t < x
   . The worker switches rms too frequently
from a social welfare perspective. We have discussed how asymmetric info results
in turnover costs for the rm. But asymmetric information also induces a welfare
loss by creating excessive turnover compared to full information.
13One might argue that such turnover costs can be eliminated with countero¤ers. Although
not included countero¤ers in this case would change nothing in this model. Since the worker gets
paid his marginal product by the outside market the wage decision by the current rm is the
same regardless of when or how many times it is o¤ered.
14Any positive match specic rents (ki;ti;t +) would be shared somehow between the worker
and the rm.
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2.3.5 Turnover rate dynamics
This simple model fails to generate two well established stylized facts relating
to turnover (see Mincer and Jovanovic 1981, Topel and Ward 1992). Here we
mention them briey and discuss how the model might be modied to produce
these results. The rst stylized fact is that turnover decreases with age. This
is easily generated by assuming that switching costs increase over the workers
lifetime. This assumption might be reasonable as workers get older they might
feel a need to establish roots. It might be increasingly di¢ cult to move family
away from friends or schools etc. Another possible alteration to the model is
to make it a nite period framework. As workers get closer to the end of their
working life the incentives to switch rms will decrease. That is, end of life e¤ects
will reduce the turnover rate over time.
The second stylized fact is that turnover decreases with rm tenure. This can
be generated by including some rm specic match quality or switching costs that
grows over the life of the match. This can either be an increase in productivity
(ex rm specic human capital) or the worker "acquiring a taste" for the rms
unique culture.
While we are able to generate these turnover dynamics by extending the model
in the aforementioned ways, our focus is on the relationship between job assignment
and turnover. Therefore for clarity and tractability we omit such dynamics here.
In section 2.5 we relax the assumption about the stationary nature of the
taste shock. We discuss how some of these established turnover dynamics can be
generated in that extension.
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2.3.6 Switching costs
Switching costs are frictions that improve the current rms relative attractiveness
to its employees. Positive switching costs are not necessary for most results of this
model. However positive switching costs are a natural and realistic assumption
that allow for realistic levels of turnover.
Proposition 12 (Comparative Statics of ) Given the above economy the equilib-
rium is a¤ected by the switching cost () in the following ways.
1) dx

d
= x
H0(x )
H(x )+xH0(x ) 2 [0; 1)
2) Turnover decreases with 
3) dV

d
= 1 G(x   ) < 1 and is increasing with 
4) Outside wage o¤er wi;t = ai;t + V  increases with 
Proof. in appendix
As the switching cost  increases, the outside market becomes less appealing
to the worker. The current rm is able to capture additional rents from this
advantage (V  increases). This increased protability comes through decreased
turnover and a reduced wage o¤er relative to the outside option (note x = wi;t wi;t
increases). Recall that all future prots are competed away in the rst period of
worker is relationship with a rm. As the value of being the current rm increases,
so will the premium paid to become the current rm, i.e. wi;t increases with .
We are unable to determine the e¤ect of an increase of  on current rm wage
o¤ers. Since both x and wi;t are increasing with , the e¤ect of switching costs
on current rm wages (wi;t = wi;t   x) will be ambiguous.
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It is no surprise that switching costs improve the current rms protability.
However the turnover mechanism we introduce has interesting e¤ects on the mag-
nitude of this change. The e¤ect of an increase in switching cost on expected
prots (V ) and relative wages (x = wi;t   wi;t) is smaller than the change itself.
The e¤ect of a change in switching cost will depend on the starting switching
cost levels. When a worker has a low switching cost, such shocks play a small role
in his turnover decision. The ability of his current rm to capitalize on an increase
in the switching cost is tempered by the workers high turnover rate. Employers
of high switching cost workers are more isolated from the outside market. For
such current rms, increases in switching costs have a greater e¤ect on protability.
Therefore the e¤ect of a marginal change in switching cost increases with switching
cost (i.e. @
2V 
@2
< 0) .
2.4 Job assignment and training costs
In this section we place structure on the worker productivity dynamics. We also
introduce job assignment in a way that is consistent with earlier theoretical work.
Particularly, we assume that jobs are ordered by responsiveness to worker ability
(ex. Sattinger 1975, Rosen 1982, and Waldman 1984b).
An important new aspect of this model is task specic training costs. In this
paper, training cost can arise from formal training provided by the rm. Al-
ternatively these costs may be a short period of very low productivity caused by
learning-by-doing.15
15It is likely that wages are negotiated less frequently than the early stages of the learning
curve. There may be a short time where the worker is much less productive at the new job.
This time of really low productivity is an implicit cost of promotion.
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We nd that current employers delay promotion longer than outside employers
to avoid paying the training cost. This delay creates a promotion wage premium
and turnover rates decrease when workers are eventually promoted.
2.4.1 Model
The only di¤erences between this and the previous model is that we now include
two jobs, a training cost and provide structure on productivity dynamics. Worker
i0s e¤ective ability is the product of their innate ability ai 2 [aL ; aH ] and their
labor market experience t 2 f0; 1; 2; ::::g: This is16,
i;t = ait: (2.16)
For each rm there are two possible jobs. If worker i performs job j 2 1; 2 at
time t, he produces
yi;j;t = dj + cji;t: (2.17)
We restrict d1 > 0; d1 > d2; c2 > c1 > 0; and aL > 0 to ensure a number of
important productivity characteristics. First, job 1 is the e¢ cient job assignment
for all workers in their rst period of work t = 0. Second, workers produce a
positive marginal product in any period. Third, marginal product is increasing
over time for all workers in all periods. Fourth, any workers marginal product
increases faster at job 2 than at job 1.
We assume that there is a training cost b > 0 that must be paid by a rm
before the worker is able to work at job 2. Once a worker has been trained at job
2 by one rm he need not be trained again by another.
16While we assume that productivity grows linearally it is not necessary for the majority of the
following results. Linearity is a su¢ cient condition for Corrollaries 3 and 4. All other results
are true under a much weaker set of assumptions on productivity growth.
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We assume that ability, training, and wage o¤ers are common knowledge.
Again a workers tastes shocks are private to the worker. The timing of each
period of this game is as follows.
Stage 1: The current rm o¤ers a wage and job assignment. If a worker
has been o¤ered promotion, the worker is trained and the current rm incurs the
training cost.
Stage 2: Outside rms o¤er wages and job assignments.
Stage 3: Worker observes taste shock for current rm and chooses among all
o¤ers.
Stage 4: Training period for outside rms (if needed).
Stage 5: Production, wage payment, and utility experienced.
The time line is similar to Bernhardts (1995) signaling model with the addition
of the training cost. Our timing assumption creates an asymmetry between current
and outside rms. The workers ability to leave after training creates a possible
loss to the current rm.17 Outside rms do not face this same risk. The worker
is not able to leave a new employer until the next period.
One might be concerned that this additional asymmetry might be the cause of
the later results. However this result occurs as an equilibrium under other timing
assumptions. For example suppose that the switching cost is weakly greater than
the training cost (i.e.   b). The only way the worker would switch again
between outside rms is if the wage increase is high enough to incur the switching
cost again. Under perfect competition, the increase in outside o¤ers after training
17The worker cannot commit to stay with the rm after being trained by paying a bond at the
beginning of the period (see Carmichael 1985; and Baker, Jenson and Murphy 1988).
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is exactly b. The worker would never have a reason to switch even if he could. In
this case the results of this model are identical to the model just presented.18
2.4.2 Equilibrium
Before we discuss the equilibrium of this model we alter some notation in order
to deal with the new complications. Since rms are ex ante identical, expected
future utilities still do not depend on the rm. However future expected utilities
and prots may di¤er depending on promotion status. We denote Ui;j;t as worker
i0s expected utility at time t given that he worked at job j in period t   1. Vi;j;t
is the expected prot of the period t current rm for hiring worker i in job j in
period t 1. As before, these values are derived under the assumption that worker
i doesnt yet know any period t taste shocks.
If worker i accepts an outside o¤er, the worker makes his employment decision
before that rm trains him. Outside rms pass any training cost directly onto
the worker through a lower wage. Let wi;2;t be the outside market wage o¤er for
worker i who is assigned to job 2 and trained by an outside rm in period t: w^i;2;t
is the outside wage o¤er for a previously trained job 2 worker i at time t: wi;1;t is
worker i0s outside market wage o¤er at job 1. Let wi;j;t be the inside rm wage
o¤er for worker i at job j = 1; 2 in period t: This wage o¤er does not depend on
the promotion history. Given the current rms job assignment decision, training
costs (if incurred) do not a¤ect the optimal wage o¤er.19
18An alternative assumption is that the training is both rm and task specic. That is, training
would need to happen again anytime the worker switched rms. The worker would never have a
reason to quit more than once each period. Under this assumption the intuition and predictions
of the model are the same although the proofs are slightly di¤erent from the version in this paper.
19If the current rm o¤ers promotion to a worker from job 1, he must pay the training cost.
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Now that we have dened the components of this game we can dene equilib-
rium. An equilibrium of this game must satisfy four sets of conditions that dene
rationality for workers and rms. The rst three sets of conditions are analogous
to the three conditions derived in the one job model. The rst set of conditions
guarantee maximal worker expected utility under zero prot restrictions for outside
rms.20 Therefore, the wage o¤er for worker i must imply zero expected prots
for any promotion status. Also, the outside market job assignment maximizes
expected worker utility given the wages associated with each job. The second set
of conditions guarantee prot maximization for the current rm. The third set of
conditions dene the rents of being the current rm. Such rents are the expected
present discounted value of worker is product minus his wages at that rm. The
fourth set of conditions dene the workers lifetime expected utility for each period
and promotion status.
Although these conditions are a natural extension of the earlier model, the
additional friction of job assignments creates a number of new variables and equa-
tions. Therefore the formal equilibrium denition is quite lengthy and is relegated
to the appendix.
Proposition 13 The above economy has a unique equilibrium with the following
characteristics
The rms optimal wage o¤er solves,
max
w
(yi;2;t + Vi;2;t+1   w) [1 G(w^i;2;t   w   )]  b: (2.18)
If the worker has been trained previously the rms optimal wage o¤er solves,
max
w
(yi;2;t + Vi;2;t+1   w) [1 G(w^i;2;t   w   )] : (2.19)
Therefore, the maximization problem for the current rm given that it trains the worker this
period is the same as if the worker was trained previously (shifted by a constant).
20As before this is implied by the Bertrand like competition that we assume.
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1) Vi;2;t = V ; wi;2;t = yi;2;t + V    x 8t:
2) wi;2;t = yi;2;t + V    b; w^i;2;t = yi;2;t + V  8t:
3) If the outside rms do not o¤er promotion at t, then the current rm will not
o¤er promotion. Vi;1;t = V  and wi;1;t = yi;1;t + V    x:
4) If yi;2;to   yi;1;to > b for some to then outside rms o¤er promotion at to:
5) If yi;2;tI   yi;1;tI > (1  )b+ ^
b
for some tI then current rm o¤ers promotion
at tI . Where ^
b
> 0 solves,
max
x
x
h
1 G(^b + x  )
i
= V    b: (2.20)
6) if yi;2;t   yi;1;t < (1   )b + ^b  yi;2;t+1   yi;1;t+1 for some t and worker i has
not been promoted by t then the current rm will deny promotion at t. Also, if
yi;2;t   yi;1;t > b then turnover rates at t are strictly greater than after promotion
(at t+ 1).
Proof. In appendix
Proposition 13 states that current and outside rms o¤er promotion in nite
time. Worker i will be promoted by the current rm or outside market each with
positive probability. Once promoted, the wage o¤ers are analogous to the one
job model. Outside rms o¤er promotion when the productivity at job 2 is at
least b (the training cost) higher than at job 1: The current rm o¤ers promotion
whenever the worker is at least (1   )b + ^b more productive at job 2: However
both the outside and current rms may o¤er promotion before this time.
We now discuss why the current rm never o¤ers promotion before the out-
side market. We rst explore the promotion decision for the outside rms.
The outside rms o¤er wages and job assignments to maximize worker utility
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under the zero prot condition. Outside rms directly pass the training cost
on to the worker through a lower wage. Therefore outside rms promote the
worker when the worker is more productive at job 2 by at least the training cost
(i:e: yi;2;t   yi;1;t > b). It may actually happen before this depending on discounted
future utilities and rm prots for the promoted vs. un-promoted worker.
If the outside market begins to o¤er promotion, promoting is in some sense
more e¢ cient than not promoting.21 Unlike the competitive outside market, the
current rm maximizes prot rather than e¢ ciency. Once the current rm decides
to train, its prot will be the same as in the one job case minus the training cost
(i.e. V    b). If the current rm does not o¤er promotion it can avoid paying the
training costs and optimally responds to outside o¤ers. If promotion is e¢ cient and
the current rm does not promote, outside o¤ers improve relative to the workers
marginal product at the current rm. This increased outside competition reduces
expected prots for the current rm. However since it can avoid training costs
the current rm may still want to ine¢ ciently delay promotion. The current
rm delays promotion as long as the e¤ect of outside competition on prots is
small. Over time the outside pressures increase until eventually the current rm
also o¤ers promotion. It is only the relative increase in the outside wage from
e¢ cient promotion o¤ers that causes the current rm to o¤er promotion as well.
Therefore the current rm will never o¤er promotion before the outside market.
The parameter ^
b
denes the promotion rule for the current rm. It represents
the e¢ ciency gains from promoting required for the current rm to pay the training
cost b: Naturally this is increasing with the training cost. Further it will be zero
when the training cost is zero. Any increase in the training cost will translate into
21Precisely this means that current productivity and future utility for the promoted worker is
at least the training cost greater than a similar un-promoted worker.
65
a larger gain in ^
b
:22
The behavior of the worker depends on more than just current wages, switch-
ing cost, and taste shock. Future utility is important and depends greatly on
promotion status. If the worker believes that he will be denied promotion in the
next period, he might prefer promotion this period at a lower present wage than
to stay at job 1. These considerations make the last result of proposition 13
somewhat weak. The result says that the current rm will not o¤er promotion
in the period just before worker i becomes (1  )b + ^b better at the higher job.
At this time if he is at least b more productive at job 2 turnover rates will be
high compared to after promotion. However, it may be the case that the current
rm o¤ers promotion well before this time. O¤ the path of play future utility
considerations become important and can inuence promotion timing.23
We now see that the promotion decisions become cleaner when the discount
factor is small compared to the di¤erence in productivity growth between jobs.
This assumption ensures a stronger result concerning the relationship between
turnover and promotion.
Proposition 14 Suppose  is su¢ ciently small. Let Ti 2 R solve yi;2;Ti   yi;1;Ti =
(1  )b+ ^b: then the following is true in equilibrium.
1) The current rm o¤ers promotion if and only if t  Ti .
22Recall from 2.20 that ^
b
solves maxx x
h
1 G(^b + x  )
i
= V    b: Therefore
maxx x [1 G(0 + x  )] = V  0 implies ^0 = 0: We know from the implicit function theorem
that d^
b
db =
1
1 G

^
b
+x(^
b
) 
 > 1: Therefore ^b > b whenever b > 0:
23For example, suppose the worker knows that he will not be promoted by the current rm in
the next period. Future utility considerations become meaningful for the worker. The di¤erence
in expected utility of a promoted vs. non-promoted worker may become signicant enough to
induce the current rm to start o¤ering promotion earlier. That is, the current rm may o¤er
promotion to worker i in some period t, but if the worker had not been promoted by period t+ 1
he would not be o¤ered promotion until period t+ 2.
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2) There exists a Ti  b (d2 d1)a(c2 c1) such that outside rms o¤er promotion if and
only if t  Ti .
3) For every t0 2 ( Ti; Ti) turnover of an un promoted worker i at time t0 is greater
than after promotion.
4) if Ti  t0 < t00 < Ti turnover of an un promoted worker is greater at t00 than at
t0:
Proposition 14 gives us the result that the current rm will only promote when
the worker is (1  )b+ ^b more productive at job 2. Similarly outside rms will
begin promoting the worker every period after some Ti but never before. The
turnover rate for worker i increases during the time where promotion comes only
from outside rms. Worker i0s turnover rate falls back to its lowest level after he
is promoted.
The condition on the discount factor for this proposition relates to the length
of time that workers are in the promotable state (i.e. when (1   )b + ^b >
yi;2;t   yi;1;t > b). If worker i will quickly transition out of this state or has a
low discount factor, future expected utility di¤erences (Ui;2;t+1  Ui;1;t+1) will be
small. As discussed previously, future expected utility di¤erences can speed up
inside promotion before yi;2;t   yi;1;t  (1   )b + ^b. If  is small the e¤ect of
future utility is weak enough that the current rm will not promote before this
rule is satised.
2.4.3 Turnover rate dynamics
Propositions 13 and 14 give us the empirically consistent result concerning pro-
motion and turnover. For any worker, turnover will be weakly decreasing with
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promotion. But suppose worker i experiences a period in his work life where he is
at least b but less than (1  )b+ ^b more productive at job 2 than job 1. Proposi-
tion 14 states that his average expected turnover rate will be less at job 2 than at
job 1. Suppose now the population of workers is su¢ ciently rich that a positive
proportion of workers experience a period where they are o¤ered promotion from
only outside employers. Then the average turnover rate for the population will
decrease with promotion.
2.4.4 Wage Dynamics
The productivity jump at inside promotion translates into a large wage increase
for the worker.
Corollary 3 Suppose there exists some period where only the outside rms o¤er
promotion. For a worker who is promoted within a rm, wage increases at pro-
motion are higher than wage increases the period before or after promotion. Wage
increases after promotion are higher than wage increases before promotion
Ine¢ cient job assignment prior to promotion drives Corollary 3. This inef-
ciency arises when only the outside market o¤ers promotion. As the current
rm delays promotion, the workers current rm wage o¤er grows slower than his
outside o¤ers (and job 2 marginal product). When he is nally promoted, his
productivity at the current rm grows by a substantial amount. His current rm
wage o¤er jumps back to a level that is closer to the outside market wages. Since
he was in some sense underpaid in the previous period, he experiences a large jump
in wages when promoted from within.
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This result is somewhat surprising when compared to a similar economy with no
training costs. Without such costs, linear ability growth implies the wage increase
at promotion is a linear combination of the wage growth the periods before and
after promotion. In this case promotion always happens in the period when
ability crosses the threshold of e¢ cient promotion. Wages are marginal product
minus a constant. The increase in productivity in the period of promotion is
the increase in ability up to the threshold (ai for some  2 [0; 1]) times job 1
productivity responsiveness to ability (c1) plus the increase in ability above the
threshold ((1  )ai) times job 2 productivity responsiveness to ability (c2). This
wage increase will always be less than wage increases after promotion which are
always the increase in ability times job 2s responsiveness to ability (aic2).
Corollary 4 The wage increase for an internally promoted worker increases with
the di¤erence between his possible job 1 and job 2 productivity levels in the period
prior to promotion.
The wage increase at promotion depends on the ine¢ ciency the current rm
tolerates before o¤ering promotion. The more ine¢ cient the job assignment was
before promotion, the greater the wage gain when nally promoted.
2.4.5 Switching Cost and Promotion
In section 2.3.6 we discussed the e¤ect of switching costs on wage o¤ers, turnover
and protability. We now examine the role of switching costs on the internal
promotion decision.
Recall that the prot of the rm is increasing and convex in the switching cost.
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The switching cost is in some sense a measure of how isolated the current rm is
from outside pressures. As the switching cost increases the rm becomes more
isolated. Any changes in the relative attractiveness of the wage o¤er has a greater
e¤ect on protability.
Corollary 5 The threshold of promotion (^
b
) is decreasing in the workers switch-
ing cost.
Proof. In appendix
Proposition (5) is written in terms of the threshold of promotion ^
b
rather
than a direct statement about turnover probability. Without knowing the ex-
act productivity dynamics it is di¢ cult to translate this into a precise statement
on promotion in the most general cases. However, under conditions satisfying
Proposition (14) we easily see that decreasing ^
b
speeds up workers promotion
(i.e. yi;2;t   yi;1;t  (1   )b + ^b sooner). In essence, less risk is involved with
training a worker with a higher switching cost. Therefore, the current rm will
train a worker with a lower turnover rate sooner. From Corollary 4 we also know
that the wage premium at promotion will be smaller.
There is some preliminary empirical evidence that is consistent with this predic-
tion. Devaro and Waldman (2006) nd that the probability of promotion increases
with education in the Baker et. al. (1994) data. They also nd that higher educa-
tion lowers the wage increase at promotion. Our model suggests that workers with
a lower turnover rate are promoted earlier and will have a smaller wage increase
at promotion. Therefore, their empirical results are consistent with this model if
(in their data set) education is negatively correlated with the turnover rate.
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2.5 Extension
It may seem unrealistic that a workers tastes are independent and identically
drawn each period. In this extension we incorporate a simple version of the
standard Jovanovic (1979a) style matching model into our framework. We do not
provide all the details or analysis here as much of it is similar to the earlier work.
But we do provide an outline and the basic results.
We retain all of the assumptions about the taste parameter  and job assign-
ment from the earlier sections. There is an additional taste shock that is constant
for the life of a match. We denote this as ki;t: At the beginning of a match 
k
i;t is
drawn from a common distribution. After the rst period of work within a rm,
both the worker and the rm perfectly observe ki;t. If the worker leaves a rm
and returns at a later period he draws a new : Each period the worker will make
its turnover decision based on the wage o¤er and that periods match (ki;t + 
k
i;t).
The rm o¤ers a wage that maximizes its expected prot given the constant part
of the match . The outside rms o¤er job assignments and wages to maximize
worker expected lifetime utility subject to the zero-prot condition.
As before, this game has a unique solution with the same characteristics as
the earlier models. There are a few new results related to the nature of : The
turnover rate is decreasing in . Also, the workers value to the rm (V ) and the
worker utility (U) will be increasing with .
Adding a persistent component to the worker taste shock generates the classical
empirical observation of decreasing turnover rate with rm tenure (see Mincer and
Jovanovic 1981; Topel and Ward 1992). In this model for a given  turnover rate
is constant. However each period, workers with lower s are more likely to quit
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than workers with higher s. For a population with the same rm tenure, the
distribution of  moves to the right over time. Since turnover is decreasing with ,
this means that average turnover rates will decrease with rm tenure. This logic
is similar to Jovanovic (1979a) in that the good matches are more likely to persist
and create lower turnover in the future.
We can also see that average turnover will be decreasing in labor market expe-
rience. This follows from the above conclusion. The longer that a worker has been
in the market the more likely he has found a higher persistent match quality ().
Over time the distribution of a workers possible  moves to the right. However,
controlling for rm tenure this e¤ect goes away.
Our nal result is that workers with a higher  are o¤ered promotion from the
current rm earlier. This result is similar to Proposition 5 dealing with switching
costs. In both cases, workers with lower turnover rates are promoted earlier than
those with higher turnover rates.
2.6 Discussion
We have seen that this stylized model produces empirical predictions consistent
with studies on training costs and promotion. We now discuss a few of these
predictions as well as some alternative explanations.
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2.6.1 Promotion and Turnover
We have discussed how training costs and our turnover assumptions can generate
a negative relationship between turnover and promotion. This is consistent with
empirical work discussed previously by Carson et al. (1994) and Saporta and
Fajourn (2003).
Another possible explanation for decreasing turnover rates at promotion might
be the tournaments argument (Lazear and Rosen 1981). The logic is as follows.
Suppose that a worker has won a promotion. This is e¤ectively the right to a wage
that is above the market wage. Once promoted, the worker will be less likely to
quit his current job and lose his relatively high wage.
To our knowledge, such a model has not been formally developed. We have
argued that workers with a high switching cost (or high persistent taste) will
be promoted earlier. Equivalently, we predict that low turnover predicts early
promotion. A tournament model with endogenous turnover may generate di¤erent
predictions on the type of worker that is more likely to be promoted. Tournament
models use wages above marginal product as prizes to induce greater worker e¤ort
at lower levels. All else equal, rms may want to promote workers with a high
turnover rate to lower the expected cost of overcompensation. However workers
with low turnover may exert more e¤ort and will be more likely to win the prize.
It is di¢ cult to say which of these e¤ects will dominate without formulating such
a model.
An empirical test that could distinguish these theories would examine turnover
rates for workers who are likely to be promoted soon. In a tournament model,
likely future internal promotion reduces the workers incentive to quit. In our
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model, workers who expect to be promoted soon are already receiving promotion
opportunities from the outside market. Therefore a tournament model would
likely predict a decreasing turnover rate before promotion. Our model predicts
the turnover rate will increase.
2.6.2 Wage premium at promotion
Empirically the large wage increase at promotion has been observed by a number
of studies (ex. Gerhart and Milkovich 1989; McCue 1996; Baker et al. 1994).
As noted in the introduction, this paper is not the rst to explain this phenom-
ena. However, to our knowledge this is the rst to generate such a result under
symmetric information about worker ability and deterministic ability growth.
The signaling models of promotion (Waldman 1984b, Bernhardt 1995) generate
promotion wage di¤erentials through signaling. A single wage is paid to workers
with di¤erent ability types but the same promotion history. This result largely
does not t the data. Even though job assignment is important in determining
wages there is still a wide variety of wages o¤ered to workers with the same job
history and set of observable characteristics.24
Tournaments (ex. Lazear and Rosen 1981) are a classic explanation for the
wage increase at promotion. Workers compete for a large pay increase through
investment in human capital. Therefore when workers are promoted they are
given a substantial raise. While this model captures some wage and promotion
dynamics there are other labor market observations not addressed by tournaments
24But possibly this could be explained by outside rms having some private information on
worker ability or a mix of symmetric and asymmetric learning (see Pinkston 2008, and Waldman
2008).
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that are captured by other models. These include, cohort e¤ects, wage increases
predicting promotion, and wage increases upon promotion are smaller than the
di¤erence in average wage levels across the jobs.
Gibbons and Waldman (1999,2006) generate a model where wages are closely
tied to ability. Wage premium at promotion are generated through their learning
mechanism. However because the rate of learning slows over time, the wage
premium is smaller with each successive promotion. This does aspect not t with
some empirical ndings of Baker et al. (1994). They nd that the wage premium
at promotion is higher at later promotions.
In our model, the wage di¤erential is tied to training costs associated with that
promotion. We do not model more than one job change in this paper. However
it is likely that successive job changes have higher training costs. In our model
the wage premium at promotion is tied to these training costs.25 Therefore, our
framework can generate increasing promotion wage di¤erentials.
2.7 Conclusion
Over the last few decades a number of theoretical models have been developed to
help better understand the relationship between the worker and the rm. However
little is understood about how the inner dynamics of the rm relates to worker
turnover. A small set of models have emerged that model turnover by including a
private worker taste (or disutility) shock. This assumption creates interesting new
insights and provides non degenerate turnover in equilibrium. To our knowledge,
25Again these might be higher explicit costs of training or the implicit costs of learning by
doing at a more important job.
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little is known about this mechanism itself. As this type of modeling is likely
to become far more prevalent in the future, it is useful to better understand this
turnover mechanism.
In this paper we begin to explore the implications of including such assumptions
into personnel economics models. We develop a theoretically rich innite horizon
model. This model provides a theoretical foundation for the cost of employee
turnover. We then discuss the various forces that inuence current wages and job
assignment. Aspects of the labor market that have not been important now become
very signicant. In particular, task specic training related to job assignment can
create frictions a¤ecting turnover rates and wage and promotion dynamics
The turnover model in this paper generates a number of results consistent with
empirical stylized facts. Further theoretical and empirical work will determine if
this new style of modeling improves understanding of the worker and rm rela-
tionship.
76
CHAPTER 3
EMPLOYEE BONDING AND TURNOVER EFFICIENCY
3.1 Introduction
Various types of employee bonding are common practices in business. Institutions
often provide an up-front payment or service with a written agreement that the
workers remain working at the institutions for a specied time. These payments
and services are as varied as signing bonuses, general skills training (i.e. college
or graduate school) or moving expenses. Other types of bonding include pensions
where workers only receive payment if they remain at a job for a su¢ ciently long
period of time. While these types of contracts are common, little attention has
been given to their e¤ect on turnover e¢ ciency. In this paper I discuss how
bonding contracts can improve welfare through a reduction in excess employee
turnover. I show that such contracts are only e¤ectual if payments upon quitting
are returned to the central organization or other third party and not the manager
who sets the employees wage.
In this paper I develop a two period labor turnover model to examine the
usefulness of employee bonding. I assume perfect competition between rms for
workers. Any expected future prots are given to the worker at the beginning of
the relationship. Therefore any policy that improves e¢ ciency improves worker
utility and is preferred by the workers.
The source of turnover and e¢ ciency in our model is (rm and time specic)
private random utility shocks experienced by the worker.1 These shocks are ob-
1These shocks have a natural interpretation. They are the various non-pay aspects of a job
whose importance to the worker is unknown to the rm. We assume that these shocks change
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served only by the worker. Also these shocks are only known about the workers
current employer. The current employer is able to exploit these shocks through
wage o¤ers that are below the employees marginal product. Therefore, the em-
ployer captures rent from the worker as long as the worker enjoysworking at the
rm enough to compensate for any di¤erences in wage. If the worker receives a
shock that is low enough, he will quit the rm and work elsewhere.
The competitive outside market sets a wage equal to the workers marginal
product. Because the workers current employer sets the wage below marginal
product, workers change employers more frequently than is e¢ cient. Some of the
time the value of the shock implies that the worker should stay, yet it does not
overcome inside and outside wage di¤erences. I argue that this type of turnover
ine¢ ciency can be improved by employee bonding.
In order for the bonding to reduce ine¢ cient turnover, the contract must have
certain characteristics. In examining the turnover e¤ects of such bonds we rst
consider a situation where the wage setter claims the payment if the employee
quits. I show that under this situation, any such bond is entirely deducted from
the wage of the employee. In equilibrium, turnover is identical to what would
happen without any such bond.
I then consider an alternative contract where the bond is centralized away from
the manager who sets the wage. In this case the wage setter does not claim the
repayment if the employee quits. When setting the wage, the manager benets
from this bond creating an additional switching cost for the worker. This induces
the manager to reduce the wage to some extent. But, since the manager does
over time. Workers can only predict future shocks for their current employer one period ahead.
Since the worker has information about the current employer, the current employer is able to
exert a kind of monopsonistic power over the employee.
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not get the repayment he does not reduce the wage by the entire amount of the
bond. Since the cost of repaying the bond is greater than the reduction in wage
the worker is less likely to quit.
This type of contract can reduce turnover ine¢ ciencies where without the bond
the turnover rate is ine¢ ciently high. Because the labor market is competitive
any e¢ ciency gains are passed on to the worker through higher wages in the rst
and/or second period. Therefore, rms that o¤er bonds that maximize e¢ ciency
will be preferred by potential employees. Such bonding not only reduces turnover,
but is also preferred by employees.
I later discuss bonds attached to rm sponsored general skills training. The
motivation for such bonding contracts is much the same as in the earlier models.
However, examining bonds in this setting allows me to generate predictions that I
can compare with the existing literature on general skills training.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. I review the relevant literature in
Section 2. I set up and analyze the simple model in Section 3. Section 4 examines
the e¤ect of bonding o¤ered by the manager and then the rm. In Section 5 I
relate this nding to employer sponsored general skills training. I discuss rm
specic human capital and pensions in Section 6. Section 7 is the conclusion.
3.2 Literature Review
One main criticism of employee bonding is that such bonds could simply be taken
from the employees wage (see Carmichael 1985). However there is evidence con-
cerning both pensions (see Allen, Clark and McDermed 1993) and rm sponsored
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training (see Manchester 2010) that suggests that bonding contracts have real ef-
fects on turnover. These papers will be discussed in more detail below in relation
to the broader literature.
A large portion of the literature on employee bonding and non marginal product
wages revolve around mitigating problems with moral hazard (see Lazear 1979,
1981, Yellen 1985, Carmichael 1985, Baker Jenson and Murphy 1987). In his
classic paper on mandatory retirement, Lazear (1979) describes how wages above
marginal product in the years right before retirement can induce workers to exert
e¤ort in earlier periods. If the worker were to shirk and be red early on in their
career, they lose out on higher pay later in life. The rm enforces mandatory
retirement in order to achieve the e¢ cient retirement date given this mechanism.
Carmichael (1985) discusses a similar use for pension plans. The e¢ ciency wage
literature discusses how rms which set a wage above market equilibrium can
induce extra e¤ort (see Yellen 1985). If workers are red for shirking they risk
losing the higher wage job. While these papers do discuss how such policies a¤ect
rings, they do not discuss the workers quitting decision.
Other work on bonding discusses the self selection of workers into or out of
jobs with pension and other bonds (see Salop and Salop 1979). The idea is that
workers who feel that they are less mobile will be more likely to take jobs with a
bond. Firms that are more concerned with maintaining a stable work force will
choose to employ such devices.
In their empirical work using PSID data, Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993)
examine the e¤ect of pensions on job mobility. It has long been observed that jobs
covered by pensions exhibit low levels of turnover. They outline three possible
explanations for this nding. The rst is the sorting story (ala Salop and Salop
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1979). The second explanation is that jobs covered by pensions tend to have higher
compensation in general.2 The third reason is the actual loss of the pension if the
worker were to quit. Allen et al use PSID data to distinguish between the various
reasons for this stylized fact. While they nd that sorting and total compensation
are important, the loss to the employee when he/she leaves has the greatest e¤ect.
This paper discusses a potential role for formal programs in reducing ine¢ -
ciently high turnover rates. With the exception of chapter 1 of this dissertation,
the work on formal compensation rules within an organization has focused on im-
proving performance by managers and employees. For example the theories on
tournaments (ex. Lazear and Rosen 1981) and up-or-out contracts (ex. Kahn and
Huberman 1988) rely on the rms ability to commit to reward workers that exert
high e¤ort or choose high investments in human capital. Other theoretical work
focuses on limiting the discretion of managers thus reducing employee inuence
activities (see Milgrom 1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1988a, 1988b) or favoritism
(see Prendergast and Topel 1996).
In chapter 1, I show that formal pay rules can reduce excess turnover ine¢ -
ciencies caused by asymmetric information concerning worker ability and wages as
signals. I show that (as is also the case in this paper) there exists some excess
turnover ine¢ ciencies under full information about worker ability. I then show
that asymmetric information about worker ability exacerbates this problem. For-
mal pay systems can reduce the higher turnover but not to the e¢ cient level. In
the current paper I show how bonding when there is full information on worker
ability can bring turnover to the e¢ cient level. The current paper should be seen
as a compliment to this earlier work on asymmetric information on worker abili-
2In another empirical paper using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation,
Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) also nd that total compensation is higher at jobs o¤ering
pensions. This is also controlling for worker characteristics.
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ties. That is, achieving e¢ cient turnover in a market with asymmetric information
about worker abilities may require both bonding and formal pay systems.
In this paper, turnover plays a crucial role. There is a vast literature on
various types of turnover mechanisms. The papers on job search and matching
provide valuable insights into the turnover process (ex. Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b;
Burdett 1978). In these classic models, turnover is a result of economic agents
attempting to improve expected match quality. Imperfect information and learning
gradually change worker and rm matches over time. While these models are able
to generate a number of empirical predictions, they do not address the idea of
employee turnover costs.3 Many such theories assume workers are paid their
marginal product (ex. Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b). In this case there is no real loss
to the rm when the worker leaves. In other turnover models workers are given
a xed proportion of their match specic rent (ex. Mortensen 1978). In this case
rms do incur an economic loss when the worker switches employers. However a
xed sharing rule of the match specic rent may not be realistic. The cost of
employee turnoveris not adequately addressed by these classic turnover models.4
The main di¤erence between this paper and the classic turnover papers lies in
the information assumption about match quality. In the current paper I assume
that the quality of the match is known and experienced by the worker. In chapter
2 of this dissertation I use a similar assumption as I consider promotion timing,
3For example, in their study of four di¤erent hotels Hinkin and Tracy (2000) estimate the
turnover cost of a front-desk associate to be from 5 to 12 thousand dollars. Over half of this
gure is non-explicit productivity costs. See also Cascio (1999) and Wasmuth and Davis
(1983) for additional examples of costs of employee turnover.
4Under traditional theories, when countero¤ers are possible, the rm will never allow a worker
to leave before o¤ering him a wage equal to his marginal product. If workers are paid their
marginal product, turnover of a single worker will not a¤ect the rms protability. Under some
restrictive assumptions, existing theory can generate endogenous turnover while rms pay a wage
below marginal product. For example, a model with random outside wage o¤ers that assumes
away countero¤ers may have this feature (see, Munasinghe and Flaherty 2005).
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wages, and turnover. In both chapters, the taste shock gives the current employer
some monopsonistic power when choosing the wage o¤er. However, when workers
decide to quit this induces an economic loss to the rm. I argue that this economic
loss is the foundation for employee turnover costs. In chapter 2 I show that this
dynamic monopsony power over current employees induces rms to create and
maintain relationships with individual workers over time. I use this model to
consider the promotion timing decision when promotion is costly to the rm and
the rm experiences outside pressures. Aside from my work, a few papers use
a similar turnover mechanism based on private worker utility (ex. Novos 1994,
Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Schonberg 2007, Ghosh 2007).
In this paper I discuss how employer sponsored training may be an avenue in
which the rm can bond the worker. Traditionally, general skills training has been
of great interest to labor economists. The early treatment of Becker (1962) argues
that workers will always reap the rewards from general training. As a result, the
worker must ultimately pay for such training either directly or through a lowered
wage during training.
Later work on information asymmetry challenged this result. For example
Katz and Ziderman (1990) discuss general training that is only observed by current
employer. In this case the employer is able to capture information rents through
uncertainty about worker productivity (see also Chang andWang 1996). This logic
is similar to Greenwalds (1986) discussion of adverse selection in the labor market.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) show that asymmetric information on training is
not needed in order to generate such rents. They show that information rents can
induce employer training when there is full information on training but asymmetric
information on ability. In a later paper they discuss other reasons why rms may
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want to o¤er training (see Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). In general these labor
market frictions "compress" the wage prole relative to actual productivity. Such
wage compressions include labor unions and complementarities with rm specic
skills.
As discussed by Becker (1962) the threat of a worker leaving the rm after
training is the main limitation to rm sponsored training. Therefore the rela-
tionship between training and turnover is important. There have been theoretical
papers that have discussed di¤erences between US and Japanese employee training
behaviors. Owan (2004) and Morita (2001) develop models with some equilibria
characterized by low turnover and high rm sponsored training. Other equilibria
have higher turnover rates and little rm sponsored training.
There has been empirical evidence that suggests that rms do pay for training
and pass on benets to employees. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) nd positive
wage returns to rm sponsored training. Further, they nd that training provided
at previous rms impact wages more than training provided by the current rm.
In regards to employee turnover, Colleen Manchester (2008) nds that employee
sponsored general skills training reduces turnover rates.
In this paper, it is not training per se that improves e¢ ciency. But, paying for
training may be a useful tool in which bonding can improve welfare. In a recent
paper, Manchester (2010) shows that the bonding aspect of training has an addi-
tional e¤ect on reducing turnover intention. In her paper she uses longitudinal
data from MBA students from the University of Minnesota. She nds that tuition
reimbursement programs reduce employees intention to quit their current job.5
5The measure of turnover she uses is the response to the question, "What is the chance that
you will voluntary quit your job in the next 12 months." She nds that this turnover intention
was a positive and signicant predictor of quits.
84
Additionally, forty ve percent of such programs use "continued service require-
ments" after reimbursement. Under these requirements the worker must remain
employed with the rm for a specied time or they must repay the bond. Twenty-
two percent of workers receiving the tuition reimbursement are required to stay
longer than 12 months. She nds that such bonding reduces turnover intention
more than reimbursement without such bonding. It is the ability of the bonding
contract to reduce turnover that motivates this paper on turnover e¢ ciency.
3.3 The Model
In this section I introduce the turnover mechanism that drives this model. I de-
velop intuition on the source of turnover costs and the rents associated with attract-
ing and retaining individual workers. This initial analysis provides a benchmark
for later analysis.
3.3.1 No Employee Bonding
There is free entry into production. All rms are identical. The only input is
labor and it is inelasticly supplied each period. A workers career lasts 2 periods.
All rms and workers are perfectly patient. All workers have marginal products
that are i.i.d. from a commonly known distribution F with support [aL; aH ]: I
will denote worker i0s marginal product each period as ai 2 [aL; aH ]: In the rst
period all information about ability is unknown. After a period of work the
workers ability becomes common knowledge.
Worker is utility consists of wages, a taste shock and a switching cost  
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0 (if incurred). The switching cost is incurred only when the worker switches
employers. Worker i0s taste shock for rm k at time t is denoted as ki;t and is private
information for the worker. All 0s are drawn independently from a commonly
known continuously di¤erentiable distribution G. The distribution G has a zero
mean and a continuously di¤erentiable density g: The hazard rate H(:) = g(:)
1 G(:)
is non-decreasing on its support. To ensure that turnover is sometimes e¢ cient, I
restrict the lower bound of the support ofG to be strictly less than . The worker
only knows his second period taste shock for the rm he worked at in period 1. All
other taste shocks are unknown. Since all rms are ex ante identical in the rst
period, the worker chooses the highest wage for his initial job. Perfect competition
between potential employers ensures that second period expected prots are part
of the workers period 1 wage.
At the beginning of period 2 the current and outside rms o¤er wages to the
worker. Given the current rms wage o¤er the workers utility if he stays with
the rm in period 2 is,
u2 = wi + i: (3.1)
The worker incurs the same switching costs for all outside rms. If worker i enters
the outside market, he accepts the highest outside rm wage o¤er, wi: In this case
his expected utility in period 2 is,
u2 = wi   : (3.2)
I assume that, if indi¤erent, the worker remains with the current rm. Therefore,
the worker will stay with his current employer if wi + i  wi   : The worker
will leave the current rm with probability,
Pr(wi + i  wi   ) = 1 G( wi   wi   ): (3.3)
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The payo¤ to the rm is simply the marginal product of its employees minus
the wage costs. A rms wage decision for a given worker i, depends on the rst
period employment relationship.6
The denition of equilibrium that I use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In
the rst period all rms are identical so the worker chooses the rm that o¤ers the
highest wage W: In the second period all rms learn the ability of the worker, but
the value of  is known only by the worker himself. All rms make wage o¤ers
and the worker chooses between o¤ers. However the worker chooses his second
period employer after observing his shock  and all wage o¤ers. The timing of
the second period game is,7
Stage 1: All rms observe ability and the current rm o¤ers a wage.
Stage 2: Outside rms observe the current rm wage o¤er and o¤er wages.
Stage 3: Each employee observes the taste shock for the current rm and
chooses between o¤ers.
Stage 4: Production, payment and utility are experienced.
In equilibrium the outside market will always bid wages up until the outside
rms are making zero expected prots.8 The current rm knows the workers
6We have not yet explicitly dened the outside option for the worker. It seems natural that
wages should be greater than zero. In order to avoid uninteresting corner solutions or negative
wages we impose the restriction that al > x (where x uniquely solves x
g(x )
1 G(x ) = 1).
However, if we instead allow negative wages and assume that there is no outside option the
results of the model are unchanged.
7In the benchmark model the timing is less important. Since workers enter the market with
positive probability and ability is common knowledge, they will be o¤ered their marginal product
by the outside market regardless of the current rms wage o¤er. However to be fully consistent
with the subsequent model we specify the timing as below for both models.
8We know this because the current rm will never o¤er a wage greater than marginal product.
The lower bound of the distribution of the taste shock is less than minus the switching cost.
Therefore there is a strictly positive probability that the worker will enter the outside market.
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outside wage o¤er and chooses a wage to maximize prots. This gives us the
following denition of equilibrium for the second period game.
Denition 4 The second period equilibrium of this economy for worker i is a
current rm wage o¤er wi; outside wage o¤er wi such that,
1. wi 2 arg maxw (ai   w) [1 G( wi   w   )] (Prot Maximization)
2. wi = ai (Zero Prot for Outside Firms)
Since the worker has information about his taste for the current rm, the
current rm has some monopsonistic power. It will o¤er a wage below marginal
product and if the workers taste shock is high enough, the worker will accept the
o¤er. The expected prots for the current rm in the second period is,
Vi = max
w
(ai   w) [1 G( wi   w   )] : (3.4)
This gives the rm positive expected prots in the second period. I now solve
for the equilibrium of this game. Substituting the Zero Prot condition into the
Prot Maximization condition I get,
Vi = max
w
(ai   w) [1 G(ai   w   )] (3.5)
= max
xi
xi [1 G(xi   )] where xi;t = ai   w: (3.6)
x is the ex post rent that a rm receives if the worker stays for the second
period. However, increasing x increases turnover. Note that the optimal value of
x is tied directly to the distribution of :
Since the worker enters the market with a strictly positive probability, Bertrand like competition
forces the wage o¤er to equal marginal product.
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The rst order condition of (3.6) in terms of xi is,
xi =
1 G(xi   )
g(xi   ) =
1
H(xi   ) : (3.7)
Recall that the hazard rate g
1 G is non-decreasing. The objective function is
quasi-concave so the rst order condition is necessary,9 su¢ cient and has a unique
solution. Let x solve the rst order condition (3.7). Since s are drawn i.i.d.
for all ability types, the equilibrium satises xi = x for all i. From (3.5) and
(3.6) I know that Vi must also be the same for all i.
Vi = max
w
(ai   w) [1 G( wi   w   )] (3.8)
= x [1 G(x   )] = V  for all i (3.9)
This gives us the unique equilibrium for every realized ability.
Proposition 15 The unique equilibrium of the above economy is as follows, where
x and V  are as dened above.
wi = ai   x (3.10)
wi = ai (3.11)
Vi = V
 (3.12)
Turnover probability = G(x   ) 8i: (3.13)
Proof. above.
Proposition 15 shows us that second period prot and turnover for any employee
will be the same regardless of realized ability. The current rm will o¤er a wage
9xi;t  0 cannot solve the maximization problem since positive prots are possible. Therefore
the solution to the maximization problem must be on the open set (0;1): If the maximum exists
it must satisfy the rst order condition.
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that is exactly x less than marginal product. This uniform result comes from
the i.i.d. assumption of the workers taste shocks. If the worker stays with the
current rm in period 2 the current rm earns a prot of x regardless of ability
type. Since the di¤erence between current and outside wage o¤ers is always x,
the turnover probability is always G(x   ). The expected second period prot
from employing worker i in the rst period is x [1 G(x   )] = V  regardless
of the realization of ability.
From this simple model I have established a few insights into the relationship
between the worker and the rm. The information on how the worker feels to-
ward their current employer is valuable to that rm. Wages optimally set below
marginal product means that rms experience an economic loss when workers quit.
I now discuss how the information asymmetry between the worker and rm
causes turnover to be too high in equilibrium. If the current rm could observe
the workers taste shock, the rm would extract all rents from the shock if it is
e¢ cient for the worker to remain with the rm. If the shock is greater than
the negative switching cost the inside rm would pay just enough to induce the
worker to stay. If the shock is too low the rm will never o¤er a high enough
wage and the worker will quit. However in this model the rm does not know
the taste shock. It must o¤er a wage depending only on the workers ability. It
cannot extract all rents but gains rents in expectation by setting this wage below
marginal product (wi = ai   x). The worker receives an outside wage o¤er of
exactly marginal product. Therefore he will switch rms whenever  < x   :
The socially optimal turnover rule is to quit when  <  : The current rms
exploitation of monopsonistic power results in ine¢ ciently high turnover.
The above ine¢ ciencies come from the di¤erences in the workers outside wage
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o¤er and the current rms wage o¤er. Turnover would always be at the e¢ cient
level if the wages were always the same. The worker is always paid his marginal
product from the outside market. Therefore turnover would be e¢ cient if the
worker were guaranteed that he will be paid his marginal product by the current
rm as well. However as previously discussed, after the worker has worked for
the rm there is an incentive to pay less than marginal product. One possible
solution to this problem is contracting for future compensation at the beginning
of the working relationship. However, this may be impossible if the workers
ability is unknown in the rst period and realized ability in not veriable in the
second period. Another possible solution is for the rm to establish a reputation.
But, this would require that both productivity and wages of previous individual
employees are observable to incoming workers. This does not seem reasonable in
many circumstances.
3.4 Bonding
In this section I explore how bonding can address turnover e¢ ciencies. I show
how this method does not require ability to be contractible. It only requires a
separation between the agent who holds the bond (rm) and the agent who sets
the wage for the employee (manager).10
10This usage of the bondholder as an outside party is related to Holmstroms (1982) work on
moral hazard in teams. In his paper the centralized rm relaxes balanced budget restrictions
within a group of workers. Mechanisms that induce optimal e¤ort are only available if there is
an outside residual claimant.
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3.4.1 Managers holding the bond.
We rst consider a contract where the manager gives the worker a monetary or
non-monetary payment valued at b > 0 during the rst period. If the worker quits
the rm in the second period he must repay the bond to the manager.
Since it must be repaid after quitting, the bond b acts as an additional switching
cost to the worker. Therefore, given inside wage wi and outside wage wi o¤ers,
the worker chooses to quit if,
wi + i  wi      b: (3.14)
As before, perfect competition in the outside market causes the market wage to be
the workers marginal product. The wage setting decision of the manager is the
same as before but now includes a payment to the manager if the worker quits.
In the second period the manager chooses the inside wage wi to solve,
Vi;m(b) = max
w
(ai   w) [1 G( wi   w      b)] + bG( wi   w      b): (3.15)
The rst term corresponds to the payment that the manager gets if the worker
stays multiplied by the probability that he stays. The second term is the payment
that he gets if the worker quits. Rearranging this expression we get
Vi;m(b) = max
w
(ai   w   b) [1 G( wi   w      b)] + b: (3.16)
This gives us the unique equilibrium for every realized ability.
Proposition 16 The unique second period equilibrium of the above economy with
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bond b is as follows, where x and V  are as dened above.
wi = ai   x   b (3.17)
wi = ai (3.18)
Vi = V
 + b (3.19)
Turnover probability = G(x   ) 8i: (3.20)
Proof. Above.
Proposition 16 shows us that very little changes with this type of bond. Any
bond b given to the worker in period one is simply deducted from his pay in period
two. If the worker stays at the job his pay is exactly b less than it would have
been had he not gotten the bond. If he quits then he pays the manager exactly b.
Turnover probabilities are exactly what they would be without the bond.
This result illustrates that as long as wages are not predetermined, it is not
simply the presence of the bond that improves employee retention. The repayment
to the manager if the worker quits negates the e¤ectiveness of the bond as an
additional switching cost. I now show that without the repayment to the manager,
such bonds can be e¤ective.
3.4.2 Firms holding the bond
We now consider an alternative bonding contract that utilizes a third party. Con-
sider a payment issued by a third party that is somewhat isolated from both the
manager who sets the wage and the employee. We refer to this third party as the
rm. The rm gives an amount b to the worker in period one. If the worker de-
93
cides to quit in period 2 the worker pays the bond back to the rm. The manager
does not get any of the bond repayment if the worker quits.
Since the worker does not care whom he must pay the bond to, his quitting
decision remains unchanged. However the second period wage decision is altered
so that the manager no longer gets paid if the worker quits. Although the bond-
ing contract does not directly involve the manager, the bond creates additional
turnover frictions that the manger can exploit.
Proposition 17 Under a third party bond contract as described above, second
period equilibrium turnover is decreasing with the bond b:
Proof. In Appendix
Proposition 17 shows that it is possible to reduce turnover ine¢ ciencies through
a bonding contract. Because the market is competitive any improvements in
e¢ ciency are passed on to the worker. The worker prefers to work for rms
who are able to reduce or eliminate turnover ine¢ ciencies. I rst describe the
equilibrium bond size before I discuss the intuition for the bonds e¤ectiveness.
Proposition 18 The unique equilibrium of the entire game has the following prop-
erties.
1) All rms o¤er a bond equal to b = 1 G( )
g( ) to all new employees in the rst
period.
2) Managers choose second period wages equal to wi = ai   b
3) Equilibrium turnover is e¢ cient.
4) First period wages equal rst period productivity plus expected second period
prots.
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Proof. in Appendix.
The most important aspect of the equilibrium described in Proposition 18 is
that the bond reduces second period turnover to the optimal level. The rst
best turnover decision is to quit if and only if  <  : This corresponds to a
turnover rate of G( ): The bond size that eliminates turnover ine¢ ciencies has
the property that the managers ex post prot, (ai   w), is exactly equal to the
bond. The wage that the manager chooses to o¤er the worker in the second
period must maximize his objectives. The wage that induces e¢ cient turnover
will be the same as the managers optimal wage only when the bond is of the size
b = 1 G( )
g( ) :
11
Proposition 17 states that this arrangement is able to reduce turnover probabil-
ities where the previous bond contract cannot. The key to this contract lowering
turnover is that the agent setting the wage does not get compensated if the worker
quits. This however does not mean that the bond doesnt increase second period
prots for the manager. Naturally, as the bond a¤ects the quitting decision of
the worker, the manager is able to exploit this friction by o¤ering a lower wage.
However the resulting wage reduction is smaller than the size of the bond.
I will now explain why the manager reduces wages by a smaller amount than
the bond. The key to this is the characteristics of the turnover mechanism. To
illustrate this I rst discuss the model without the turnover mechanism. Suppose
that there is no private taste shock in this model. The employee would stay with
the rm as long as the inside wage is greater than the outside wage minus the
switching cost and bond. The manager wants to maximize prots and therefore
11The rst order condition that denes the managers optimal wage is ai wi = 1 G(ai wi b )g(ai wi b ) :
E¢ cient turnover happens when ai   w = b. Both of these conditions are satised when the
bond is b = 1 G( )g( ) .
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he chooses the lowest wage so that the employee does not quit. Therefore as
the bond increases the wage o¤ered decreases by the same amount. Without the
private taste shocks it doesnt matter if the manager gets the bond if the worker
quits or not. There would be no turnover in equilibrium and wages are the same
regardless of who is paid the bond if the worker quits.
I now examine the wage decision when there are private taste shocks. If the
workers bond increases, the manager has the option of decreasing the wage by
the same amount without a¤ecting turnover. If he does this, the ex post prots
if the worker stays is larger. Therefore, the manager incurs a greater loss if the
worker decides to quit. Because of this greater loss, the manager has an increased
incentive to reduce the turnover probability. The manager reduces turnover by
choosing to decrease the wage by less than the amount of the bond.
The relationship between wages and later compensation is consistent with em-
pirical work by Montgomery and Shaw (1997). In their paper they use the 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances and detailed data on pensions form the Pension
Provider Survey to show a negative relationship between pension size and wages.
Further the reduction in wages is smaller than the increase in the value of the
pension.
The key to a bonds ability to simultaneously reduce wages and turnover de-
pends on the structure of the contract. As we have seen in Proposition 16, turnover
is unchanged if the manager is paid if the worker quits. It is only the use of a
third party that allows for turnover ine¢ ciencies.
One critical aspect not formally modeled in this paper is that the rm must
have the ability not to interfere in the managers wage setting decision after the
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initial contract. That is, the rm cannot choose to reward the manager with
extra compensation when the employee quits. This type of commitment seems
reasonable through reputation as long as the rm is long lived.
The ability of rms to implement the necessary separation between the bond
holder and the wage setter may be tied to the rms size and structure. Only rms
that are able to separate the wage setter from the bond holder will be able to use
this mechanism to reduce turnover. It may seem reasonable to assume that larger
rms might have more commitment power and su¢ cient bureaucracies to utilize
such bonding.
Two characteristics of e¤ective bonding in this model include turnover reduc-
tion and a wage reduction that is smaller than the bond. I now discuss empirical
evidence on the relationship between bonding, turnover and wage reduction for
di¤erent rms of di¤erent sizes. One study by Even and Macpherson (1996) uses
a variety of data sets to conclude that generous pensions at larger rms reduce
turnover more than pensions at smaller rms. This is of course controlling for
pension and worker characteristics. Montgomery and Shaw (1997) show that the
wage reduction associated with an increase in pensions are smaller for larger rms.
Both of these pieces of evidence suggest that the e¤ectiveness of bonding in reduc-
ing turnover ine¢ ciency increases with rm size.
3.5 General Skills Training
One very common practice in business is the provision of general skills. In this
section I show how bonding contracts tied to the provision of general skills training
can improve turnover. As before, this turnover reduction is welfare improving and
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thus preferred by workers. Further this model generates predictions on turnover
and income that are consistent with empirical ndings.
3.5.1 Worker Paid Training
One major prediction in the seminal paper by Becker (1962) is that it doesnt
matter who contractually pays for general skills training. Once trained, the worker
will be o¤ered his marginal product by outside employers. Therefore the only way
that the rm would be willing to pay for the training is if the compensation was
lowered by the same amount. In this case even though the rm may be paying the
direct costs, these costs are passed on to the worker who essentially pays for his
own training. In order to compare the above results to that of worker sponsored
training I briey discuss general skills training by the worker.
We now consider the e¤ect of general skills training that is paid for by the
worker. The timing of the game is now as follows. After the rst period of work,
the worker purchases training at a cost of b: In order to isolate the e¤ect of the
bond on turnover e¢ ciency I consider training that in itself creates no e¢ ciency
gains or losses.12 That is, training that costs the amount b will increase the
marginal product of the worker by the same amount b:
For an inside wage wi and outside wage wi the worker will choose to quit the
rm if wi + i  wi      b: Because the worker gets to keep his increased
productivity to the outside market, the new outside wage is wi = ai + b: The
repayment to the rm is perfectly o¤set by the increase in productivity.
12Some of the limitations on the use of bonds may be on socially acceptability of di¤erent types
of contracts. Minimum employment requirements tied to rm sponsored general skills training
seem to be prevalent and acceptable. I use this assumption on training costs and benets to
generate predictions specic to this type of bond that are independent of training e¢ ciency.
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Proposition 19 If workers directly pay for general skills training b, the unique
equilibrium of the above economy is as follows, where x and V  are as dened
above.
wi = ai + b  x (3.21)
wi = ai + b (3.22)
Vi = V
 (3.23)
Turnover probability = G(x   ) 8i: (3.24)
Proof. Analogous to proof of Proposition 1.
The importance of Proposition 19 is to point out that it is not the training
that reduces turnover. Turnover rates are the same as without any bonding or
training. Once the worker has paid for his own training, he is treated by the rm
just as he was before only paid a higher wage.
3.5.2 Firm Sponsored Training
We now consider the e¤ect of general skills training that is paid for by the rm.
Instead of the worker directly paying the training costs, the rm pays for training
and the manager sets the second period wage. If the worker chooses to quit after
training but before the second period, he must repay the training cost to the rm.
For an inside wage wi and outside wage wi the worker will choose to quit the
rm if wi + i  wi      b: Because the worker gets to keep his increased
productivity to the outside market, the new outside wage is wi = ai + b: The
repayment to the rm is perfectly o¤set by the increase in productivity.
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As before the manager o¤ers a wage to the worker to maximize second period
prots. Since the worker now is more productive, the managers second period
wage decision is to solve,
max
w
(ai + b  w) [1 G(ai   w   )] : (3.25)
Proposition 20 The training b results in an increase in wage that is smaller than
b and a reduction in turnover probability.
Proof. In Appendix.
Proposition 20 states that this type of bonding results in a reduction in turnover.
Even though the bondmust be repaid, some of the increase in productivity is passed
on to the worker through higher pay. This increase in pay reduces turnover rates.
As before turnover reduction improves welfare up to a point. Therefore, the rm
will want to consider the appropriate amount of training in order to minimize
ine¢ ciencies.
I now discuss how this turnover reduction is accomplished through training
and bonding. The worker is required to pay training costs if he quits. Therefore
the protability increase from training could improve only the inside option. The
outside option of quitting remains the same as without the training. Since the bond
must be repaid, the workers outside option is simply equal to the workers ability
without the training. Under the assumption that training improves productivity
by the cost of training there is no change in the outside option..
As before, the reason the contract can increase wages and retention is because
it utilizes a third party (or the centralized rm). The manager who sets the
wage is not reimbursed if the worker quits. Since the worker must repay the
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bond if he quits, the value of the workers outside option is the same as without
training. The manager has the option of setting the wage equal to the optimal
no-training wage. If he does this, turnover rates will be the same as without
training. But now, because the worker is more productive than without training,
the loss associated with turnover is greater. As a result, the no-training wage
is no longer optimal. The manager is willing to o¤er a higher wage in order to
increase retention. But, the managers optimal wage increase will be less than the
productivity gain associated with training.
As with other types of employee bonding, rm sponsored training has the ability
to reduce turnover in equilibrium. In the absence of such bonding, the resulting
second period turnover is ine¢ ciently high. In this model we have assumed that
the labor market is competitive. We have shown that even without e¢ ciency gains
in production, training with bonds can be preferred by workers. This rationale
behind training is di¤erent than those of other explanations of general training (for
example Katz and Ziderman 1990, and Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999). Unlike
other work, it is not asymmetric information about abilities or wage compression
that motivates the rm to provide such training. Providing training is simply
another way that the rm has the ability to provide a turnover reducing bond.
In this model I have extracted away from asymmetric information about abil-
ities or other wage compression explanations of general skills training. There is
some evidence to suggest that training can generate such frictions (see Manchester
2008, 2010). But, there is also evidence to suggest that continued employment
bonds have an additional role in reducing turnover rates (see Manchester 2010).
It seems that continued employment contracts connected to the rms provision of
general skills are socially acceptable. Firms can use such bonds to reduce turnover
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ine¢ ciencies and be a more competitive employer.
3.6 Firm Specic Training and Pensions
Thus far we have discussed how bonding can overcome turnover ine¢ ciencies
caused by monopsonistic behavior of rms. The source of ine¢ ciency is rooted
in the turnover mechanism of worker taste shocks. In this section I discuss why
some rms and industries may have a greater need for such bonds. I consider
how the loss of rm specic human capital can be an additional source of turnover
e¢ ciencies.
It has been shown in previous theoretical work that rm specic human capital
can increase retention (see Munasinghe and OFlaherty 2005). I show that this is
also true in our model even without bonding. However even with this increased
retention, turnover ine¢ ciencies may be greater in the presence of rm specic
human capital. The source of additional ine¢ ciency is the loss of positive rm
specic human capital when the worker quits. When the worker develops rm
specic human capital, the manager passes some of the additional productivity on
to the worker thus reducing turnover. However the manger also keeps some of
this increased productivity for himself. Although turnover is reduced, it is not
reduced enough to overcome additional losses from rm specic human capital.
Because the manager keeps some of the increased productivity, the range of taste
shocks that result in ine¢ cient turnover increases with rm specic human capi-
tal. Depending on the distribution of taste shocks this can cause higher expected
turnover ine¢ ciencies.
The setup in the model is exactly the same as in Section 3.3 with the following
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change. The worker has a higher marginal product in the second period at the
rm he worked for in the rst period. In the second period he produces ai if he
changes employers and ai +K if he stays with the current rm (where K > 0):
This additional amount K represents rm specic human capital accrued over rm
tenure.
Let us consider the e¤ect of the rm specic human capital on wages and
turnover in the absence of bonding.
Proposition 21 Without bonding, equilibrium turnover rates are decreasing with
rm specic human capital.
Proof. In Appendix.
This result is consistent with the theoretical model of Munasinghe and OFlaherty
(2005) who nd that returns made from investments in rm specic human capital
reduce turnover. In essence, the rm specic human capital works in a similar
way to the bond or employee switching costs. That is, the rm specic human
capital is an additional benet from the match between the worker and manager.
The manager is willing to share this benet with the worker in order to reduce
turnover. Although rm specic human capital reduces turnover, there may be
an increase in the economic loss associated with turnover.
Lemma 1 The range of taste shocks that result in ine¢ cient turnover is increasing
with the level of rm specic human capital.13
Proof. In Appendix.
13This assumes e¢ cient turnover is possible. That is, the probability that  <     K is
strictly greater than zero.
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Lemma 1 comes from the increased losses to society when a worker quits a job
where he has rm specic human capital. It becomes e¢ cient to stay with the
rm for lower draws of the taste shock when there is rm specic human capital.
This e¢ cient cuto¤ value falls at the same rate as the rm specic human capital.
The actual turnover rate is also reduced by rm specic human capital but by a
smaller degree. This is because the manager does not pass on all rm specic
human capital gains to the worker through a higher wage. The manager instead
chooses to keep some of that additional productivity as ex post prot. That is, the
manager increases the wage by a smaller amount than the increase in rm specic
human capital. Therefore, the actual retention taste shock cuto¤ value decreases
by a smaller amount than the amount of rm specic human capital. The range of
taste shocks that result in ine¢ cient turnover gets larger with rm specic human
capital.
Lemma 1 does not directly consider expected turnover ine¢ ciencies. It only
deals with the range of taste shocks that result in ine¢ cient turnover. In order to
show that rm specic human capital increases expected losses from turnover one
must consider the distribution of taste shocks. For example, if the distribution
of taste shocks is su¢ ciently at in the relevant range, higher rm specic human
capital will result in greater e¢ ciency losses. Firms facing such issues may have a
greater need to employ bonds such as pensions to reduce or eliminate high turnover
ine¢ ciencies.
One interesting prediction of the model deals with the lifetime compensation
di¤erences between pensioned and non pensioned jobs in a competitive equilibrium.
In a competitive labor market, ex ante identical workers can have higher lifetime
compensation at jobs with pensions. The reasoning is as follows. There are two
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sources of utility in this model. These are money and non pecuniary taste shocks.
Jobs that o¤er pensions exhibit lower turnover rates. Therefore, the average taste
shock of workers who stay at pensioned jobs will be lower than the average taste
shock for those who stay at non pensioned jobs. In a competitive labor market, the
worker is indi¤erent between taking a pensioned or a non pensioned job. Workers
expect to experience lower non pecuniary utility at the pensioned job. If work-
ers are indi¤erent between pensioned and un-pensioned jobs, lifetime monetary
payment must be higher at the pensioned job in order to compensate for lower
non monetary compensation. This logic is consistent with empirical work that
nds that pensioned jobs exhibit higher lifetime monetary compensation for the
same observable worker characteristics (see Allen, Clark and McDermed 1993, and
Gustman and Steinmeier 1993).
3.7 Conclusion
This paper continues the discussion of employee turnover using a relatively unex-
plored and intuitive turnover device. Clearly, rms are concerned with employee
retention and discussing various types of compensation in relation to turnover
seems natural. If workersquitting decisions are randomly a¤ected by forces out-
side the wages o¤ered, the question of turnover e¢ ciency seems relevant.
In this paper I have discussed how bonding contracts are related to turnover
rates and turnover e¢ ciency. This work is quite di¤erent in motivation from
other explanations addressing moral hazard considerations. Unlike the moral
hazard literature this paper focuses on the quitting decision rather than ring. To
my knowledge this is the rst paper that has addressed the e¤ect of such bonds
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on the e¢ ciency of the quitting decision.
In this paper I have characterized how the bond contract must be written in
order to be e¤ective. I have also discussed a number of di¤erent types of bonds
seen in industry. I have related this work to empirical studies on pensions and
continued employment requirements tied to tuition reimbursement plans. This
model generates explanations and predictions consistent with empirical ndings.
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APPENDIX A
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND WAGE SIGNALS:
Proof. Of Claim 1. By contradiction. Suppose there exists some a00 > a0
where wi(a00) < wi(a0); Let us denote G00 = G(bi (wi(a00))  wi(a00)  ); and G0 =
G(bi (wi(a
0))  wi(a0)  ): Sequential rationality for type a0 implies
(a0   wi(a0)) [1 G0]  (a0   wi(a00)) [1 G00] : (A.1)
) [1 G0] > [1 G00]. Sequential rationality for a00 implies, (a00   wi(a00)) [1 G00] 
(a00   wi(a0)) [1 G0] : wi(a00) < wi(a0) and [1 G0] > [1 G00] implies,
(a00   wi(a00)) [1 G00]  (a00   wi(a0)) [1 G0] (A.2)
> (a00   wi(a0)) [1 G00]
> (a00   wi(a00)) [1 G00]
Which is a contradiction. Therefore the wage o¤ers must be weakly increasing
with ability.
Proof. of Proposition 2 First show that the wage prole is continuous, For
the type aH ; the only possible solution is wi(aH) = aH   x: Where x =
arg maxx [1 G(x  )] : This solves the rst order condition [1 G(x   )]  
xg (x   ) = 0: Since the hazard rate is non decreasing, the expression x [1 G(x  )]
is increasing for 0 < x < x and decreasing when x > x:
I denote x(a) = a wi(a) as the ex post rent on a worker with ability i if he stays
with the rm. Given a00 > a0 Let us denote G00 = G(bi (wi(a00)) wi(a00)  ); and
G0 = G(bi (wi(a0))  wi(a0)  ): Sequential rationality for type a0 implies
(a0   wi(a0)) [1 G0]  (a0   wi(a00)) [1 G00] : (A.3)
and (a00   wi(a00)) [1 G00]  (a00   wi(a0)) [1 G0] (A.4)
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) (a00   a0) [1 G00]  x(a00) [1 G00]  x(a0) [1 G0] (A.5)
 (a00   a0) [1 G0]
Since [1 G00]  [1 G0] This implies that x(a00)  x(a0): x(a00) [1 G00]  
x(a0) [1 G0] > 0 and a00  aH implies that x(a00) < x(a0): By the squeeze prin-
ciple the expression x(a) [1 G(x(a)  )] is continuous with respect to a: Since
x(a) is strictly monotonically decreasing on a < aH and x [1 G(x  )] is strictly
monotonically decreasing on x < x therefore x(a) must also be continuous as well
as wi(:): Now I can show that the relationship between ability types and x(a)
must be unique. Since x() is strictly decreasing with a it is invertible. I will now
solve for the derivative of a^(:) = x 1(): Rearranging the inequality (A.5) I get
a00   a0
[1 G0]

G00  G0
x(a00)  x(a0)

+ 1  x(a
00)
[1 G0]

G00  G0
x(a00)  x(a0)

(A.6)
 a
00   a0
x(a00)  x(a0)  1 
x(a00)
[1 G0]

G00  G0
x(a00)  x(a0)

(A.7)
As a00   a0 ! 0 by the squeeze theorem I know that da^
dx
= 1  x g(x )
[1 G(x )] : Since I
know x(aH) = x this uniquely denes the function,
a^(x) = aH +
Z x
x

1  z g (z   )
[1 G (z   )]

dz < aH :
Therefore if there is a separating equilibrium it must be, wi(ai) = ai   a^ 1(ai)
for all ai 2 [aL; aH ] with beliefs bi(w) = w 1i (w) for all w 2 [wi(aL); wi(aH)].
The equilibrium beliefs o¤ of the path of play are not unique but one solution
is bi(w) = aH for all w =2 [wi(aL); wi(aH)]. I will now show that this is indeed
an equilibrium. Given ai and the beliefs of the outside market bi(w) the rms
decision is to nd a wage o¤er
wi (ai) 2 arg max
w
(ai   w) [1 G(bi (w)  w   )]
Since the beliefs are continuous and monotonic for w 2 [wi(aL); wi(aH)] I can show
that there is no incentive for the rm to deviate to another wage on the path of
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play. I will examine an equivalent problem is to choose the signaled ability by a
choice of signaled x: Therefore the problem now becomes
a^ 1(ai) 2 arg max
x2[a^ 1(aH);a^ 1(aL)]
(ai   a^(x) + x) [1 G(x  )] (A.8)
The rst derivative of the objective function with respect to x is
(1  a^0(x)) [1 G(x  )]  (ai   a^(x) + x) g(x  ): (A.9)
Substituting in a^0(x) this becomes
1 

1  x g (x  )
[1 G (x  )]

[1 G(x  )]  (ai   a^(x) + x) g(x  )(A.10)
= (a^(x)  ai) g(x  ):
Since g(x   ) > 0 always this objective function is increasing for x < a^ 1(ai),
increasing for x > a^ 1(ai) and is maximized exactly at x = a^ 1(ai): To show that
the rm cannot earn more expected prots by o¤ering a wage o¤ the path of play I
need to show that paying a wage higher than wi(aH) is worse than paying wi(aH):
Consider any wage higher than wi(aH) denoted w:
(a0   w) 1  G = (a0   aH + aH   w) 1  G (A.11)
= (a0   aH)

1  G+ (aH   w) 1  G
< (a0   aH)

1 GH+ (aH   wi(aH)) 1 GH
Since wi(aH) was chosen to maximize the prots of the aH employer and w >
wi(aH) )

1 GH > 1  G : A Similar argument shows that the rm will
never o¤er a wage lower than wi(aL): Therefore this is an equilibrium.
Proof. of Proposition 5. Given a single wage w; the probability of turnover is
G(a   w   ) which is increasing with ability (a). Since the turnover rate is in-
creasing with ability this means that the turnover rate on a workers below average
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ability is less than the turnover rate on workers above the average ability. There-
fore
R a
al
(a a)G(a  w)dF (a) R aH
a
(a a)G(a  w)dF (a) > 0)
R aH
aL
aG(a  w)dF (a)R aH
aL
G(a  w)dF (a) > a:
The average ability of the quitter is higher than the average ability overall (and
by extension the stayer)
Proof. of Proposition 6. Given an upper wage bound w^h < aH x induces some
pooling at the top of the ability distribution. That is there exists some a00 such that
all ability types greater than a00 are o¤ered w^h: The average ability of the worker
that is o¤ered w^h is ah: Further since w^h = ah  x and ah = E [aja > a00], a00 and
w^h are jointly determined. By the continuity this implies that the equilibrium
wage prole w(a) must satisfy,
(a00   wi (a00)) [1 G (a00   wi (a00)  )] = (a00   w^h) [1 G (ah   w^h   )]
(A.12)
Dening as before x (a) = a  w(a); this equation can be written as
x (a00) [1 G (xi (a00)  )] = (a00   ah + x) [1 G (x   )] (A.13)
The separation that happens below the highest wage is dened from the ability
associated with each level of x:The unique unrestricted equilibrium is dened as
dened as,
a^(x) = a00 +
Z x
xi(a00)

1  z g (z   )
[1 G (z   )]

dz for x > xi (a
00) : (A.14)
The unique fully separating equilibria is wi(ai) = ai   a^ 1(ai) for all ai 2 [aL; aH ]
with beliefs bi(w) = w 1i (w) for all w 2 [wi(aL); wi(aH)]. The equilibrium beliefs
o¤ of the path of play are not unique but one solution is bi(w) = aH for all w =2
[wi(aL); wi(aH)]. I know that for the separated ability an increase in x decreases
protability. Naturally pooling at the top increases average protability of highest
paid workers to its maximal level. In order to show that some restriction is prot
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improving it is su¢ cient to show that such pooling lowers the ability associated
with any given x: Taking the derivative of A.14 with respect to a00:
da^(x)
da00
= 1  x0 (a00)

1  xi (a00) g (xi (a
00)  )
[1 G (xi (a00)  )]

: (A.15)
Taking the derivative with respect to A.13 with respect to a00 gives us,
x0 (a00)

1  xi (a00) g (xi (a
00)  )
1 G (xi (a00)  )

=

1  da
da00

1 G (x   )
1 G (xi (a00)  ) :
(A.16)
Combining these equations I get
da^(x)
da00
= 1 

1  da
da00

1 G (x   )
1 G (xi (a00)  ) : (A.17)
Since lima00!aH
da
da00 =
1
2
reducing a00 improves prots on nonpooled ability types.
Proof. Of Proposition 7. I rst show that the expected welfare function given
ability type a is convex with respect to a
 (a) = x (a) [1 G (x (a)  )] +
Z 1
x(a)
[1 G (  )] d (A.18)
0 (a) = [1 G (x (a)  )]

1  x (a) g (x (a)  )
[1 G (x (a)  )]   1

x0 (a)(A.19)
= [1 G (x (a)  )] (1  x0(a)) (A.20)
00 (a) =  g (x (a)  )x0 (a) + g (x (a)  ) (x0 (a))2 (A.21)
  [1 G (x (a)  )]x00 (a)
> 0
Because this is convex the expected welfare on workers within the range is greater
than the expected welfare on the average worker within that range. E [ (a) ja 2 [aL; a0]]
  ([E (a) ja 2 [aL; a0]]) : However these two get closer if the distribution is less
spread out.
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Take any a0 > aL and I will now show that a lower wage restriction wL that
induces pooling from aL to a0 has a lower x^l than the x(a) for the mean ability
worker within that range a^:
Let x^ = a^   w^l be the average expected ex post benet to the rm. The
individual rationality condition for the worker type a0 is,
(a0   a^+ x^) [1 G (x^  )] = x (a0) [1 G (x (a0)  )] : (A.22)
I now show that x^ < x(a) by contradiction. Suppose that x^  x(a^): ) the
expected prot and retention rate on the average worker is less under pooling than
under full separation. i:e:
(x^) [1 G (x^  )]  x (a^) [1 G (x (a^)  )] : (A.23)
Also since the prot function V (a) = x (a) [1 G (x (a)  )] is convex and increas-
ing in a with a slope equal to [1 G (x (a)  )] ; The slope between the point
(a^; V (a^)) and (a0; V (a0)) which is must be greater than the slope at a^. Therefore
V (a0) V (a^)
a0 a^ > [1 G (x (a^)  )] : Rearranging this we get
(a0   a^+ x (a^)) [1 G (x (a^)  )] < V (a0): (A.24)
Combining this with A.23 we get
(a0   a^+ x^) [1 G (x^  )]  (a0   a^+ x (a^)) [1 G (x (a^)  )] < V (a0):
This is a contradiction therefore x^ < x(a^). Since the turnover rate on the pooled
wage is now lower than the turnover rate of the average worker (within that range)
under separation, if the distribution of ability types within this range is not too
spread out, then the lower bound can improve welfare.
Proof. Of Proposition 10. Since the budget constraint is determined prior to the
learning of abilities it may not be optimal for a given set of workers. I can see
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this as I examine the rst order conditions for the maximization problem. The
Lagrangian for this problem is,
L (w1; ::; wn; ) = 
n
i=1ai [1 G (ai   wi   )] (A.25)
+ (K   ni=1wi [1 G (ai   wi   )])
The rst order condition for worker i0s wage is,
(ai   wi) g (ai   wi   )   [1 G (ai   wi   )] = 0 (A.26)
The optimal solution to the constrained optimization problem for worker i will
be the same as the unconstrained problem if and only if the shadow price ()
is one. The shadow price () has an important meaning in this case. It is
the increase in expected output for corresponding to a one dollar increase in the
budget. Therefore if the rm could, it would set the budget such that this shadow
price would be unity. In order for this to be a saddle point, the total ability of the
worker under the manager must be K
[1 G(x )]   nx: However since the budget
is set prior to the observation of worker ability this happens with probability zero.
When the combined ability stock is too high or too low the constrained wages
are di¤erent from the optimal unconstrained wages. Therefore ex post expected
prots are below optimum.
Proof. Of 2 The FOC for ai can be written as
1

  1

ai + ai   wi = 1
H (ai   wi   ) = 0 (A.27)
If  > 1; this implies that there is too much ability relative to the budget. There
will be a greater di¤erence between ability and wages are taken from higher ability
workers. As a result, turnover is greater for higher ability workers. When  < 1
the budget is high compared to average ability. More of the excess is given to the
higher ability workers. Turnover is lower for the higher ability workers.
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APPENDIX B
TURNOVER AND PROMOTION
The following shows some of the properties of the problem that we will be using
repeatedly in our analysis. We will now show these in the most general terms so
that we will easily use them to prove the various propositions within the paper.
Proposition 22 Suppose that G is a CDF with a continuous, di¤erentiable density
g on its support. Where the supremum of the support of G is x > ": Let the hazard
rate H = g
1 G be non decreasing. Given the following maximization problem and
solution
V (") = max
x
x(1 G(x+ ")) (B.1)
The following is true.
1. The solution to the problem x(") is single valued, continuously di¤erentiable
with derivative x0 (") =  x(")H
0(x(")+")
H(x(")+")+x(")H0(x(")+") 2 ( 1; 0]
2.V (") is continuously di¤erentiable, decreasing with derivative V 0(") = (1 G(x(")+
"))
Proof. Of Proposition 22. 1.Since the hazard rate is non decreasing, the objective
function is quasiconcave and the rst order condition xH(x + ") = 1 is su¢ cient.
Also since H is continuous and non decreasing there will always exist an x > 0
that solves this equation. Let us label the solution x("): By the implicit function
theorem x0 (") =  x(")H
0(x(")+")
H(x(")+")+x(")H0(x(")+") 2 ( 1; 0] Since non-decreasing H implies
H 0  0 . Part 2. follows directly from the envelope theorem. V 0(") = (1  
G(x(") + "))
Proof. Of Proposition 12
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1)From Proposition 22 dx

d
= x
H0(x )
H(x )+xH0(x ) 2 [0; 1):
2) This follows directly from 1. Since x increases with  at a rate less
than one, this implies that as  increases x    decreases and therefore turnover
[1 G(x   )] decreases as well.
3) Also from Proposition 22 dV

d
= [1 G(x   )] : We know from 2) that it
decreases as  increases.
4)This follows directly from the increasing V  in part 3)
Notation 3 let i;t; i;t 2 f0; 1g represent the training decision for the current and
outside rms respectively. Since training costs are born once, we only consider the
decision to train a previously untrained worker. Let i;t = 1 if worker i0s current
rm decides to train him at time t else i;t = 0. Let i;t = 1 if an outside rm
trains worker i given that (untrained) worker i enters the outside market at time t
else i;t = 0. For simplicity, we assume rms o¤er promotion when indi¤erent.
Denition 5 Given worker i; equilibrium is a series of promotion decisions for
current and outside rms, fi;tg ; fi;tg current wages for un promoted and pro-
moted workers fwi;1;tg ; fwi;2;tg ; outside wage o¤ers with no promotion f wi;1;tg,
outside rm wage o¤ers with promotion f wi;2;tg, outside rm wage o¤ers if al-
ready promoted fw^i;2;tg, and expected prots for the current rm on a worker that
was not promoted, and promoted, fVi;1;tg ; fVi;2;tg, ex. post expected future utilities
of a promoted and un promoted worker fUi;1;tg ; fUi;2;tgsuch that for all t  1 Con-
ditions 6, 4, 5, and 7 are satised.
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Condition 4 (Zero Prot for Outside Market)
1) w^i;2;t = yi;2;t + Vi;2;t+1
2) wi;2;t = yi;2;t + Vi;2;t+1   b;
3) wi;1;t = yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1;
4) i;t =
8><>: 1 if wi;1;t + Ui;1;t+1  wi;2;t + Ui;2;t+10 if wi;1;t + Ui;1;t+1 > wi;2;t + Ui;2;t+1
Condition 5 (Expected Prots for Current Firm)
1) Vi;2;t = maxw (yi;2;t + Vi;2;t+1   w) [1 G(w^i;2;t   w   )]
2) Vi;1;t = max
8><>: Vi;2;t   bmax
w
(yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1   w)

1 G(uoi;t   w   )

Once the worker has been promoted the denition of V is analogous to the one
job model. For a worker i who has yet to be trained, the rm can train him at
the beginning of period t or not. Once worker i is trained, the current rm treats
training costs as sunk. The wage decision will be the same as if the worker was
promoted in an earlier period. Therefore, If he trains worker i in period t, the
rms payo¤ is  b plus the same payo¤ as if the worker was trained prior to t. If
the current rm doesnt train at t, he chooses a potentially di¤erent wage o¤er.
Condition 6 (Prot Maximization for Current Firm)
1) wi;1;t 2 arg maxw (yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1   w)

1 G(uoi;t   w   )

2) wi;2;t 2 arg maxw (yi;2;t + Vi;2;t+1   w) [1 G(w^i;2;t   w   )]
3) i;t =
8><>: 0 if Vi;1;t > Vi;2;t   b1 else
where
uoi;t = max f wi;1;t + (Ui;1;t+1   Ui;1;t+1); wi;2;t + (Ui;2;t+1   Ui;1;t+1)g (B.2)
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uoi;t is untrained worker i
0s expected wages and additional future utility for entering
the outside market.
Condition 7 (Expected Utility)
1) Ui;2;t =
R1
 1maxfwi;2;t + Ui;2;t+1 + ; w^i;2;t + Ui;2;t+1   gg()d
2) Ui;1;t =
8><>: Ui;2;t if i;t = 1R1 1maxfwi;1;t + Ui;1;t+1 + ; uoi;t + Ui;1;t+1   gg()d if i;t = 0
Proof. of proposition 13
We know from proposition 11 that the equilibrium conditions are satised for
period in which the worker has already been promoted. We now show that both
the current and outside rms will o¤er promotion after some nite time. Once we
know this, we use backward induction to solve the rest of the game to show that
the solution exists and is unique.
1), and 2) follow directly from identical analysis as proposition 11.
3) If i;t = 0; the outside rms are not o¤ering promotion at the wage, wi;1;t =
yi;1;t+Vi;1;t+1: If the current rm does not o¤er promotion, his expected prots are,
max
w
(yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1   w) [1 G(yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1   )] = V : Solving this problem
wee see that the current rms wage o¤er will be, wi;1;t = yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1   x: If
it o¤ers promotion, its expected prots are V    b: Therefore if the current rm
expects the outside rms will not promote the worker, it will not o¤er promotion
either.
4) In order to show this we must rst know that in any equilibrium, Vi;1;t is
bounded above by V : Also we must know that future worker expected utility is
greater for a promoted worker, when the worker is more productive at the higher
job. Once we know this, yi;2;t  yi;1;t ) Ui;2;t+1  Ui;1;t+1 yi;2;t   b  yi;1;t )
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yi;2;t   b+ V  + Ui;2;t+1  yi;1;t + Vi;1;t + Ui;1;t+1: Therefore, wi;2;t + Ui;2;t+1 
wi;1;t + Ui;1;t+1: By Condition 4 the outside rms o¤er promotion.
We now prove that the su¢ cient conditions used above satised in any equi-
librium. We rst start with the assumption on V: If the current rm o¤ers
promotion Vi;1;t = V    b < V : If the current rm doesnt o¤er promotion,
Vi;1;t = max
w
(yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1   w)

1 G(uoi;t   w   )

: The value of Vi;1;t is de-
creasing with uoi;t. Since u
o
i;t is bounded below by yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1; Vi;1;t must be
bounded above by V  by proposition 22.
We will now prove that yi;2;t > yi;1;t ) Ui;2;t+1  Ui;1;t+1. The expected utility
If nobody o¤ers promotion can be written as,
Ui;1;t = yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1 + Ui;1;t+1 +
Z 1
 1
maxf  x; gg()d: (B.3)
If the worker has already been promoted expected utility can be written as
Ui;2;t = yi;2;t + V
 + Ui;2;t+1 +
Z 1
 1
maxf  x; gg()d: (B.4)
To simplify the analysis for the worker who is only promoted by outside rms, I
introduce the following notation.
i;t = yi;2;t   yi;1;t +  (V    Vi;1;t+1) +  (Ui;2;t+1   Ui;1;t+1)  b: (B.5)
i;t Can be interpreted as the di¤erence between the non current random shock
component of expected utility for a promoted vs. un promoted worker. (Note,
that outside rms will o¤er promotion whenever i;t  0:) The expected utility of
a worker that will be o¤ered promotion from only the outside market at time t is,
Ui;1;t = yi;2;t + V
 + Ui;2;t+1 + (B.6)Z 1
 1
maxf i;t +   x(i;t); gg()d
Where x(i;t) = arg max
x
x

1 G(i;t + x  )

(B.7)
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The di¤erence in expected future utilities between a promoted vs. un promoted
worker becomes very important in employment decision for the worker. We will
now show that the di¤erence between expected utility for a promoted vs un pro-
moted worker will be non negative Whenever yi;2;t  yi;1;t.
Case 1. (both current and outside rms o¤er promotion) If both the current
and outside rms o¤er promotion at time t then for a worker at the beginning of
time t his expected utility (before observing taste shock) will be the same whether
or not he has previously been promoted. i.e. Ui;1;t = Ui;2;t:
Case 2. (only outside market o¤ers promotion) If at time t only the outside
market o¤ers promotion then i;t  0 and the di¤erenceZ 1
 1
maxf  x; gg()d (B.8)
 
Z 1
 1
maxf i;t +   x
 
i;t

; gg()d
= Ui;2;t   Ui;1;t  0:
Since x0 (:) >  1 (from Proposition 22) and i;t  0 implies i;t + x
 
i;t
 
0 + x(0) = x
Case 3 (neither current nor outside rms o¤er promotion) Proof by contradic-
tion. Suppose that at t neither the current or the outside rm o¤ers promotion to
an un promoted worker i: Also assume, yi;2;t > yi;1;t and Ui;2;t < Ui;1;t. If no rms
o¤er the worker promotion at time t then the di¤erence in current and outside
utility from (B.3) and (B.4) is
Ui;2;t   Ui;1;t = yi;2;t   yi;1;t + (V    Vi;1;t+1) + (Ui;2;t+1   Ui;1;t+1) (B.9)
yi;2;t > yi;1;t, V   Vi;1;t+1; and Ui;2;t < Ui;1;t implies that Ui;2;t+1 < Ui;1;t+1. Because
we know that yi;2;t+1 > yi;1;t+1, neither the inside nor the outside rm will o¤er
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promotion at time t+ 1 (by cases 1 and 2). By forward induction it must be true
that the employee will never be o¤ered promotion in the future. Therefore we
solve for what the workers lifetime expected utility if not promoted at time t:
Ui;1;t = 
1
k=0
kyi;1;t+k +
V 
1   +

R1
 1maxf x; gg()d
1  : (B.10)
And if he is promoted at time t;
Ui;2;t = 
1
k=0
kyi;2;t+k +
V 
1   +

R1
 1maxf x; gg()d
1  : (B.11)
Since yi;2;t yi;1;t  0 and y2 is growing faster than y1; Ui;2;t Ui;1;t = 1k=0k (yi;2;t+k   yi;1;t+k) >
0: This is a contradiction to the assumption that Ui;2;t < Ui;1;t: Therefore it must
be the case that Ui;2;t  Ui;1;t whenever yi;2;t  yi;1;t: Therefore the outside rm
will o¤er promotion whenever yi;2;t   b  yi;1;t:
5) yi;2;tI   yi;1;tI > (1  )b+ ^
b
implies that outside rms o¤er promotion since
^
b
> b. Therefore
i;t = yi;2;tI   yi;1;tI +  (V    Vi;1;tI+1) (B.12)
+ (Ui;2;tI+1   Ui;1;tI+1)  b
 ^b:
Since Ui;2;tI+1  Ui;1;tI+1 and V    Vi;1;tI+1  b. i;t  ^
b
implies that
maxx

1 G  i;t   x    maxx h1 G^b   x  i = V    b;
by denition of ^
b
. Therefore the current rm will promote the worker since he
weakly prefers to do so.
6) yi;2;t+1   yi;1;t+1  (1   )b + ^b ) worker i will be promoted at t + 1.
Therefore Ui;2;t+1 = Ui;1;t+1 and yi;2;t   yi;1;t < (1  )b+ ^b implies,
i;t = yi;2;t   yi;1;t +  (V    Vi;1;t+1)  b < ^
b
: (B.13)
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Therefore the inside rm will not o¤er promotion at t: If yi;2;t   yi;1;t > b then
i;t > 0: Outside rms o¤er promotion. Turnover rates are higher than after
promotion or before worker i is o¤ered promotion at all. That is,
1 G(i;t + x(i;t)  ) > 1 G(x   ): (B.14)
Condition 8
  (c2 c1)aiR1
 1maxf x; gg()d 
R1
 1maxf ^
b
+ x

^
b

; gg()d
: (B.15)
Proof. Of Proposition 14. We start by showing that i;t is increasing each period
when t  Ti: We will do this using an induction proof. All other results follow
directly from the increasing nature of i;t. Let Ti 2 R Solve yi;2;Ti   yi;1;Ti =
(1  )b+ ^b: Let t = max ftjt < Tig : Promotion will be o¤ered by the current
rm at time t + 1: Therefore V    Vi;1;t+1 = b; and Ui;2;t+1 = Ui;1;t+1
From Condition 8,
  (c2 c1)aiR1
 1maxf x; gg()d 
R1
 1maxf ^
b
+ x

^
b

; gg()d
(B.16)
<
(c2 c1)a+(Vi;1;t (V  b))R1
 1maxf x; gg()d 
R1
 1maxf i;t+ x(i;t); gg()d
(B.17)
=
(c2   c1) a+ (Vi;1;t   (V    b))
Ui;2;t   Ui;1;t : (B.18)
Since i;t < ^
b
and Vi;1;t  V    b: By the linearity assumption (c2   c1) a =
yi;2;t   yi;2;t 1   (yi;1;t   yi;1;t 1): Rearranging the inequality we get,
i;t = yi;2;t   yi;1;t + b  b (B.19)
> yi;2;t 1   yi;1;t 1 + (V    Vi;1;t) +  (Ui;2;t   Ui;1;t)  b (B.20)
= i;t 1: (B.21)
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Now that we have shown i;t > i;t 1; we will perform the induction step.
Suppose that ^
b  i;t  i;t 1 for some t  t: Since maxx [1 G (  x  )]
is decreasing in  then Vi;1;t < Vi;1;t 1: Since x0(:) >  1 )  maxf i;t +   
x
 
i;t

; g is increasing in i;t. Therefore i;t  i;t 1 ) Ui;2;t Ui;1;t  Ui;2;t 1 
Ui;1;t 1 )
i;t 1 = yi;2;t 1   yi;1;t 1 + (V    Vi;1;t) + (Ui;2;t   Ui;1;t)  b (B.22)
> yi;2;t 2   yi;1;t 2 + (V    Vi;1;t 1)
+(Ui;2;t 1   Ui;1;t 1)  b
= i;t 2
Since we know that i;t > i;t 1 we also know that i;t is increasing, and expected
prots Vi;1;t are decreasing whenever t  Ti
1) Since we know that i;t is increasing until time period Ti we know that
i;t < ^
b
for all t < Ti: Therefore the current rm will never o¤er promotion
before Ti
2) We know that i;t is increasing for t < Ti and  0 when yi;2;t   yi;1;t  b.
There will be a time Ti where i;t < 0 if and only if t < Ti. That is, the outside
market will always o¤er promotion after Ti but never before.
3) For any period t0 2   Ti; Ti the current rm will never o¤er promotion before
this time. Since each period turnover rates are less than 1 there is a positive
probability that the worker will be un promoted at time t0. t0 > Ti;t ) i;t > 0
)the turnover rate (1 G(i;t +x(i;t) )) will be greater than after promotion,
or when no rms were o¤ering promotion.
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4) This follows directly from the increasing nature of i;t
Proof. of Corollary 3 Let t be the last period before promotion is o¤ered from
within the rm. By assumption the outside market is o¤ering promotion at t
that is
i;t = yi;2;t   yi;1;t +  (V    Vi;1;t+1) +  (Ui;2;t+1   Ui;1;t+1)  b(B.23)
= yi;2;t   yi;1;t   (1  )b > 0:
Let
x(i;t) = yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1   wi;1;t : (B.24)
Since x0() >  1 and i;t > 0 we know that
i;t   x(i;t) > x (0) = x: (B.25)
Substituting in x = yi;2;t+1 + V    wi;2;t+1; (B.23) and (B.24) we get
yi;2;t + (Ui;2;t+1   Ui;1;t+1)  wi;1;t   b  yi;2;t+1   wi;2;t+1: (B.26)
Therefore,
wi;2;t+1   wi;1;t  yi;2;t+1   yi;2;t + b = c2ai + b: (B.27)
Wage growth at promotion must be greater than aic2 + b: And as we have seen in
the simple model, wage growth after promotion must be exactly aic2: Therefore
we have shown that wage growth after promotion must be smaller than before
promotion.
Now we will show that wage increases the period before promotion must be less
than c2. Under condition 8 we have shown that i;t is increasing until promotion.
We need to look at wage increases for both the conditions if the outside market
o¤ers promotion at t   1 and when it doesnt.
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Case 1. The outside market is o¤ering promotion at both t and t 1: Suppose
i;t  i;t 1, x0() >  1 implies,
i;t + x
 
i;t
  i;t 1 + x  i;t 1 : (B.28)
Substituting in (B.23) and (B.24) for both t and t   1 implies
yi;2;t+(Ui;2;t+1 Ui;1;t+1) wi;1;t  yi;2;t 1 +(Ui;2;t Ui;1;t) wi;1;t 1 (B.29)
since promotion is assured at t + 1; Ui;2;t+1 = Ui;1;t+1 and this becomes
yi;2;t   yi;2;t 1   (Ui;2;t   Ui;1;t)  wi;1;t   wi;1;t 1 (B.30)
Wage growth before promotion is bounded above yi;2;t   yi;2;t 1 = c2ai:
Suppose instead that i;t < i;t 1; x
0()  0 ) x  i;t  x  i;t 1 )
yi;1;t + Vi;1;t+1   wi;1;t  yi;1;t 1 + Vi;1;t   wi;1;t 1
) yi;1;t   yi;1;t 1 + Vi;1;t+1   Vi;1;t  wi;1;t   wi;1;t 1 Wage growth is
bounded above by yi;1;t   yi;1;t 1 = c1ai < c2ai:
Case 2. The outside market is o¤ering promotion at t but not t   1: If the
outside market does not o¤er promotion at t   1 we know that
wi;1;t 1 = yi;1;t 1 + Vi;1;t   x: (B.31)
Since the rm will o¤er promotion at t + 1;
wi;2;t+1 = yi;2;t+1 + V
   x: (B.32)
From (B.27),
wi;2;t+1   wi;1;t  c2ai + b (B.33)
) wi;2;t+1   c2ai   b  wi;1;t 1  wi;1;t   wi;1;t 1:(B.34)
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Substituting (B.31) and (B.32) into the left hand side and rearranging the inequal-
ity gives us,
c2ai > c2ai + (yi;2;t 1   yi;1;t 1) +  (V    Vi;1;t)  b  wi;1;t   wi;1;t 1: (B.35)
Since the outside rms o¤er promotion t but not at t 1) (yi;2;t 1   yi;1;t 1)+
 (V    Vi;1;t)  b < 0: Therefore the wage increase before promotion is less than
the wage increase after promotion.
Proof. of Corollary 4 Given wi;1;t = yi;1;t +  (V    b)   x(i;t) and wi;2;t+1 =
yi;2;t+1 + V
   x;
wi;2;t+1   wi;1;t = aic2 + i;t + b+ x(i;t)  x: (B.36)
Where i;t = yi;2;t   yi;1;t   (1  )b (B.37)
Since i;t is increasing in the di¤erence in productivities at the two job assignments
before promotion, and i;t + x(i;t) is increasing in i;t : The wage premium
at promotion is also increasing in the di¤erence in productivities at the two job
assignments before promotion.
Proof. Of Corollary 5. Recall that ^
b
solves the equality,
max
x
x
h
1 G(x+ ^b   )
i
= max
z
(z) [1 G(z   )]  b:
Both maximization problems have a unique solution and they are continuous and
di¤erentiable in both ^
b
and . Using the implicit function theorem to nd the
e¤ect that  has on ^
b
we get
@^
b
@
=
[1 G(x   )] 
h
1 G(x(^b) + ^b   )
i
h
1 G(x

^
b

+ ^
b   )
i < 0 (B.38)
We know that 0 < b < ^
b
therefore by Proposition 22, turnover will be less
for the promoted worker than for the un promoted worker (1   G(x   ) >
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1   G(x(^b) + ^b   )) This implies that, given the workers switching cost, the
current rm will o¤er promotion when yi;2;t yi;1;t > ^b+(1  ) b: This threshold
of promotion ^
b
is lower for a worker with a higher switching cost.
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APPENDIX C
EMPLOYEE BONDING AND TURNOVER EFFICIENCY
Proof. of Proposition 17The manager chooses a wage to maximize second period
expected prots,
Vi;f (b) = max
w
(ai   w) [1 G( wi   w      b)] : (C.1)
As in the previous sections the outside market o¤ers a wage equal to the workers
marginal product. His optimal decision is now
wi;f (b) = arg max
w
(ai   w) [1 G(ai   w      b)] : (C.2)
rewriting the optimal ex post rent as a function of the bond we get x (b) = ai  
wi;f (b): Since the objective function is quasiconcave this must solve,
xi (b) =
1
H(xi (b)     b) : (C.3)
From the implicit function theorem the derivative of xi (b) with respect to b is,
x0i (b) =
xi (b)H
0(xi (b)     b)
H(xi (b)     b) + xi (b)H 0(xi (b)     b) 2 (0; 1) : (C.4)
Since xi(b) is increasing with b at a slower rate than 1 this implies that the turnover
rate G(xi (b)     b) is decreasing with the bond b:
Proof. of Propostion 18. Since there is Bertrand like competition in the rst pe-
riod, the equilibrium bond size and rst period wage maximize expected e¢ ciency.
Second period optimal turnover happens when the wage is equal to marginal prod-
uct minus the bond. In the second period, managers choose wages to solve the
following rst order condition ai wi = 1 G(ai wi b )g(ai wi b ) : Therefore a bond equal to
b = 1 G( )
g( ) will induce the optimal turnover rate of G( ) in the second period.
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The optimal bond size is unique since the turnover rate is decreasing with the size
of the bond.
Proof. of Proposition 20. The manager chooses a wage to maximize second
period expected prots,
Vi;t(b) = max
w
(ai + b  w) [1 G( wi   w      b)] : (C.5)
As in the previous sections the outside market o¤ers a wage equal to the workers
marginal product. His optimal decision is now
wi;t(b) = arg max
w
(ai + b  w) [1 G(ai   w   )] : (C.6)
rewriting the optimal ex post rent as a function of the bond we get xi (b) = ai +
b  wi;f (b): Since the objective function is quasiconcave this must solve,
xi (b) =
1
H(xi (b)     b) : (C.7)
From the implicit function theorem the derivative of xi (b) with respect to b is,
x0i (b) =
xi (b)H
0(xi (b)     b)
H(xi (b)     b) + xi (b)H 0(xi (b)     b) 2 (0; 1) : (C.8)
Since xi(b) is increasing with b at a slower rate than 1 this implies that the turnover
rate G(xi (b)      b) is decreasing with the training b: Recall that the wage
wi;t(b) = ai + b  x (b) : Training results in an increase in the wage that is smaller
than the training cost.
Proof. of Proposition 21. The manager chooses a wage to maximize second
period expected prots,
Vi;t(K) = max
w
(ai +K   w) [1 G( wi   w   )] : (C.9)
As in the previous sections the outside market o¤ers a wage equal to the workers
marginal product. His optimal decision is now
wi;t(K) = arg max
w
(ai +K   w) [1 G(ai   w   )] : (C.10)
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rewriting the optimal ex post rent as a function of the bond we get xi (b) = ai +
b  wi;f (b): Since the objective function is quasiconcave this must solve,
xi (K) =
1
H(xi (K)    K) : (C.11)
From the implicit function theorem the derivative of xi (b) with respect to b is,
x0i (K) =
xi (K)H
0(xi (K)    K)
H(xi (K)    K) + xi (K)H 0(xi (K)    K) 2 (0; 1) : (C.12)
Since xi(K) is increasing with K at a slower rate than 1 this implies that the
turnover rate G(xi (K)      K) is decreasing with the training K: Recall that
the wage wi;t(K) = ai + K   x (K) : Training results in an increase in the wage
that is smaller than the training cost.
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